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THE PUBLIC SERVICES Oi? GOUVERNSUR MORRIS TO 1787
I. Family and Early Life.
In the biography of any ilmGrican statesman of the Revo-
lutionary period, there can be no more interesting chapter than the
one depicting his connecticn with the making of the Constitution
of the United States. To shov; that a irian v/as influential in the
federal Convention is almost enou h in itself to prove him great,
while to show that he contributed some of the important parts of
our Constitution , is to put him in the front rank of all Americans,
w'e cannot properly appreciate any man of the Constituti on-m.aking
period, nor can v/e give him proper recognition for his public ser-
vices, until vie study his life in the light of his influence in the
making of the .\rjerican Oom:nonwealth.
IIo man has "been more neglected as to the part he play-
ed in the "'ederal Convention than has '^iouverneur llorris. Jared
Sparks, nis first biogra-~her, writing in 1^U32, devoted gIx pages
of three volumes to a description of i^orris' work in the Convention.
Sparks .•as necessarily unable to use v^adibon's notes; therefore
we must excuse him. Anne Gary Iilorris, who published a Diary
and Correspondence in 1809, gave but nineteen pages to the
vrhole of his life to 1788. Theodore Roosevelt wrote a one volume
life in 1R88 which is mi-ch more readable, and in v.-hich a tetter
sense of proportion is displayed than in 'rj.ni^ of the others •
His chapter on Morris' work in the Convention sketches in a rather
detailed way his views on the important issues. However, even that
"ork does not give him due credit for t'-.e role he played in the

Convent ion.
Therefore, the main purpose of this paper is to out-
line the work of Ilorris in the Convention, his views on the irapor- i
tant questions , and his special contributions to the plan of gov-
ernnent. In order to give a proper background for sucn a study,
it will be necessary to sketch his early life with especial ref-
erence to his public services and his relation to tne governraent,
both state and national, before 1787.
G-ouverneur Morris was born January 31, 1752, on' the
old family manor of Morrisania, county of Westchester, New York.
His ancef^tors for three generations had lived on thiL' manor, and
had be*^n prominent men in colonial affairs. His grandfather,
Lewis T!orris, had been Governor of 'Sev; Jersey; had also served
in the Assembly, and bp Chief Justice of New York. His father,
Levis Morris, was also e member of the New York Assembly ^acting
as a suT)-nnrter of the -nonuler side in the interest of the rights
and privileges of the peor)le. Gouverneur had three brothers,
LBwis, Richard, and Staats Long; the first of these was an ad-
vocate of freedom at the begining of the Revolution, hvt the last
of them was a resident of England^ a supporter of tne irov/n,and
at one time a member of Parliament.fi)
The Morris family from its first establishmen l m
America belonged to the powerful land holding class who played so
large a part in the history of New York. This aristocracy, be-
cause of its independence after its establishment, did not always
support the crown, although, on the other hand, it did oppose
that group which events prior to the Revolution developed into
the radicals.
fl) Sparks, Gouverneur Morris,!, 1-4.
I

The early English governors had been instriiox-ed to give
large grants of land to the men of influence and ahility in the
colony, in order to gain their support/l). These early land grants
had built up a small band of closely related families of wealth
and power, who were known as the aristocracy, and in v.'hose hands
was a large p^rt of the most valuable land of the colony.
Richard Morris, the great-grandfather of Grouvernetir
,
came to America in the middle of the seventeenth century, and
acquired an estate from the King in the county of Westchester (2),
This estate had been invested with manorial privileges by the
original grant, as had practically all the large estates in New
York. At the time of the Revolution there were six manors in
Westchester, of which Morrisania was one of the smallest, but,
nevertheless, was large enough to identify the Morris family
with the aristocracy. They were still further connected with that
class through intermarriages with the Philipse and De Lancey fam-
ilies (3).
There were two other classes besides the aristocracy;
first, the freemen and freeholders to the value of forty pounds,
to which class political priveleges were given; and second, the
laborers and holders of small freeholds, who were unfranchised (4 )
.
The aristocratic class had always been in control of
the colony, not by organization as a court or popular party, but
by organization as a social class. Once they had oeen firmly
fDBecker, Political Parties in the Province of New York, a.
(2) Sparks, Gouverneur Korris, I, 1.
f3)3ecker. Political Parties in the Province of New York, 13.
(4) Ibid, 10-11.

4established on their iDanors, they no longer felt that they need
support the crown: therefore many of the most prominent families
supported the Assembly as against the Governor(l). So we find lew-
:
is Horris, the father of Qouverneur, following in the footsteps
of the grandfather as a stanch supporter of the Assembly, opposing i
all executive encroachments on the privileges of the peoplefS). /It
the same time
,
many of the aristocratic class supported the crown
either by virtue of office or personal sympathy. Thus Lewis
Morris the grandfather was at one time Governor of New Jersey,
and a member of the court party; later, as a member of the New
York Assembly, he jealously opposed any extension of the power of the
executive ( 3)
.
Until about the time of the birth of Morris, there was
no thought of democracy among the oOlonistp, who were content to
follow the aristocratic leaders. In ?7estchester five-sixths of the
population lived on the manors, and the elections were determined
by the Philipses, the Gortlands, and the Morrisesf4). The Assembly
did not represent the people, but only a class who, in protecting
their own interests against royal encroachments, were protecting
the interests of the whole colony. Of course this war not done
in the name of class interests, but rather under the guise of the
general welfare of the people. On the other hand, the aristocratic
class Trere just as much opposed to any extension of privilege
to the unfranchisedf who composed a majority of the people), as
fl)Becker, Political Parties in the Province of New York, 12.
f 2) Sparks, Gouverneur Morris, 1,3.
f3) Ibid, I, 2.
,
(4) Becker, Political Parties in the Province of New York, 14,
==========___=====____.

5they were opposed to yielding any of their own privileges to the
crown. Yet, they were always supporters of government and the
British Constitution as represented in their own institutions.
In was into this social class of a powerful landed ar-
istocracy that Gouverneur !^orris was born, and the inheritance of
three generations made his alignment with them the more secure.
Lewis Morris, his father, died when the hoy was only
twelve, hut he left ample provision for the care of his rife and
the education of hi a son. His mother was a Gouverneur, one of the
French -tiugenots, and it may he the French strain which gave him
that satirical sense of humor, making him so different from the
always serious and ponderous men of his period. Of his early hoy-
hood there is only the record of tradition, which has it that he
was not overly fond of hooks, hut rather sought pleasure in out-
door sports.
Morris went to Kings College in the City of Kew York,
whence he graduated at the age of sixteen (1). Here his hahits
were not those of a grind; rather he was noted for his alertness,
versatility, and facility of acquisition. After leaving college,
he began to study law as wac expected of a man of his family. He so
ap-nlied nlmsel'f with study that he was licensed to practice in
Cctoher, 1771, at the early age of nineteen years and nine months (2)
But, even hefore this, Morris had slipped out into the
world of politics and puhlic affairs. In 1769 a paper money hill
was before the He?; York Assemhly. I.Torris wrote several criticisms
of the hill, pointing out with a good deal of acute aess the various
defects and unsound principles which he conceived the hill to
(1) Sparks, Gouverneur Morris, 1,6.
(2) Ihid, I, 15.

containfl) . I'*Iorris continiTed to take an interest in all public af-
I
fairs, bTit, at the sarne time, no did not neglect his rofession.
; Nor did he neglect the social side of life, hut entered that life nf
pleasure to which his social standinf^ gave him ready access. It was
not long, however, until the events of 1775 and 1776 pushed hoth
pleasure and office Vv^ork from the stage in order that more stirring
scenes might hold sv/ay.
During the years immediately -^receding the Revolu-
tion, Morris had no more idea of separation from England than had
most of his contemr,oraries. The aristocracy had opposed the stamp
act, but in a lav/ful manner, in v/hioh tliey were distinguisherl from
the riotous radical organizations (2). Tlio problem before luorris
anri his arictocratic friends was to determine the bacir, of set^' le-
m.ent with rlngland ,. Morris writes in 1774, ''I see that if the dis-
putes with l^rnat Britain continue, v;e shall bo undej' the dominion
of a riotous miob. - - - - -i-t in the interest of ;ill men to seek re-
union with the T^arent state " (3). Horris was remaining true to
his class interests in urging reconciliation, but \"hen the break
came he was one of the first of the conservatives to break the bonds
of an aristocratic training, and to unite with the radicals with
whole-souled support f4)
.
(1) Sparks, Gcuverneur Morris, I, 13-15.
(2) Becker, Political Parties in the ""rovince of IIbw York, 51.
(3) ST^arks, I, 25.
(4) Becker, 207.

7II. Public Services in New York.
The old Ijew York Assembly, v;hich had been loyalist
in tone, adjourned in April of 1775, never to reconvene. The direc-
tion or the op'oosition to ^reat Britain viae now in the hands of
various oxtra-legai but ^Topmarly olocted comi'-.ittees . The Committee
of One-Humdred
,
v.iiich was at ihis time dominant in th--^ city, is-
sued letters calling for elections tor a i'rovincicl Congress. In
.Vestchester only the radicals met since the conservatives ignored
the meeting (1). I'his meeting elected Goiiverneiir Liorris as one
of the deputies from '.Vestchester (3)» This did not orove tliat he
was a radical at this time because the radicals were wise enough to
elect a number or men who were rather moderate in order to concil-
iate the the conservative class (4). At the same time he dis-
played a strmg nationalistic attitude because his first act in the
Provincial Congress was to support a resolution that implicit obed-
ience be given to the Continental Congress (5). Due to a decided-
ly conservative element the resolution was laid on the table \
V/hen I.Iorris first took his seat in the .''rovincial
Congress, he entered on a public career v/hich wai: to continue, with
(i) Becker, Political Parties in the irovince of :iew York, 202.
(3) Sparks, Gouverneur Morris, I, 36
.
!
(4) Becker, Political Parties in the Province of :;;ew York, 206.
(5) Sparks, Gouverneur !iorris, I, 36

8but fev; intermiSw^ions , to the time of his death. Even aiiring those
periods when he did not hold a pnblio office, his thoughts were
constantly in the realm of politics and public affairs. His char-
acter was admirably fitted for the career he was to follow. In the
first place he had absolute confidence in himself, and he often
said that in his intercourse with men, he never knew the sensation
of fear or inferiority, of embarrassment or awkwardness fl). He
was gifted with the power of ready speech, and could always think
straight to the point. His keen sense of humor distinguished him
from most of his contemporaries, but it, in the end, lost him
more friends than it made him, because of the bitter satirical
turn it often took. His most prominent bad quality was his ab-
solute disbislief in all human honesty, and distrust in an motives,
no matter how good and sincere they might be.
While in the Provincial Oongress, Morris rapidly devel-
oped into a leader in all state affairs, t)oth legislative and
military, second only perhaps to Jay. As one of the leaders he
was put on every important committee, where he labored, zealously
for the public good. In the first Provincial Congress his most
valuable services wore on the financial committees, where he help-
ed to devise ways for raising money. Morris recommened in a re-
port that paper money be issued, this issuance to be made by.
the Continental Congress and apportioned among the states. This
report was adopted, and forwarded to Congress. Morris was also on
the committee empowered to draw up a resolution as to the basis
of reconciliation f2) . Here he again displayed ?iis nationalistic
fl) Sparks, Gouverneur Morris, I, 10. i
(2) Ibid, I, 49.
;

breadth of mind "by securing the pasGage of a resolution that the
report be sent to the ITew York delegates in the Continental Con-
gress, hut that it should not be obligatory on them. He was clear-
headed enough to see that reconciliation was an affair of the
united colonies, and not of Hew York alone. The attendance soon
dwindled so much that it was impos^-ible to get a quorum. To
adr^inister the affairs of the col^^ny a Committee of Saftey was ap-
pointed, of which Morris was a memberfl). By this time Morris
was a leading radicalf2).
The second Prohincial Congress was elected at a time
i 3
)
of the loyalist reaotion^j therei'ore v/as loyalist in tone. It
met in the first part of 1776, but did nothing of importance. Its
members were irresolute as to t?ie course they should pursue^wavcr-
ing between neutrality and passive support of the patriot cause.
The third Provincial Congress, which m.et in May of 1776,
had v^rork cut out for it to do^ The questions of independence
and of the establishment of a state government were both alive,
and had to be settled. Thus far, few people in New York had thought
•Beriously of independence,. The delegates to Congress were in-
structed to act onl^' on the basis of ultimate reconciliation
v/ith the mother country. However,, they were soon brought up sharply
by the fact that reconciliation was no longer possible* It was
imperative that every colony should take a definite stand. The
Provincial -Congress was handicatped by the fact that it v;as
not empowered by the people to grant any more power to its
fl) Becker,. Political Parties in the Province of New York, 207.
(2) Ibid, 207.
(3) Ibid, 228.

delegates in Congress, who were
,
therefore, unable to take any
stand on the question of independence. Morris, as a radisal
,
nov/
favored the pursuit of the war only on the basis of a fight for
independence.
Congress had reoommended that each colony establish a
regular form of government, which resolution came before the
Provincial Congress in June. Morris opened the fight for the im-
mediate establishment of a new government, and in thn uourse of
II
a long speech delivered in June said: As a connection with Great
Britain without enslaving America, an independence is absolutely
necessary" fl). No longer did he feel that v/e were dependent on
the mother country, and no longer did ho support the British
Constitution, for he said: " Trurt crocodiles, trust the hungry
wolf in your flock, or a rattlesnake in your bosom, you may yet be
something wise. But trust the King, his ministers, his commis-
sioners, it is madness in the extreme" (2), !,!orris may have dis-
played irresoluteness in the early part of the Revolution, but when
it Came to the crisis, he at once united with the supporters of
independence. 7rom this time until the end of the struggle no one
stood firmer in unwavering patriotism, demanding independence,
than did Morris.
While the Provincial Congress was still considering
the draft of the Declaration of Independence, the news of its a-
doption by the Continental Congress reached them. They at once
unanimously approved the action of Congress, caused the Declaration
to be published throughout the colony, and changed tne name of
(1) Sparks, I, 97
(2) Ibid, I, 107.

11
the Provincial Congress to the Convention of the Representatives
of New York. The question of a form of government vms nui xaken
up until August, when a committee was appointed to draw up a plan
|
of government. On that committee were Gouverneur Korris
,
John
;
Jay, and Rohert Livingston.
This committee did not report until March 12, 1777.
When they did report, it was practically a finished document
,
as
but few changes were made in the Convention itself. The Consti-
tution was finally adopted April 20, 1777, and went immediately
into effect fl)
.
The exact amount of credit that must be given Morris
for his phare in framing that first state oonstitution, is a
question. There is no doubt that he was one of the leaders in
both the committee and the Convention. However, sinue Xiie committee
kept no records, and the Convention kept no official record, we
cannot determine just what credit should be given to any one man.
It has been said that Morris, Jay, and Livingston acted as a sub-
committee of the general committee, but this is extremely doubtful.
However
,
they were all very good friends, and v/e have it from Jay
that they met often to consult concerning various parts of the in-
strument (2). Jay was probably the leader of the three. william
Jay, his son, who had sufficient opportunity to ascertain the true
facts in the case, states that the draft of the G on,- ii bution
presented was in his fathers handwriting (3). A writer under the
fl) Lincoln, Constitutional History of ITew York, I, 556.
f2) Jay, Correspondence
, f Johnston ed,), I, 128.
(3) LincKon, 'Constitutional History of Ilev/ York, I, 496
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name of Sch-ayler in the Nev/ 'ork Columbian says that the draft was
chie-^ly drawn up b;/ 7t . Jay, and that a considerable part of the
instrument came from his hands (1). Nevertheless, since Morris
was greatly interested in such matters, it is certain that if he
was on the committee, the instrument was not all the worR of one
man. Furthermore, such a period of time elapsed between when the
committee was a"npointed and when it met, that the various ideas,
acting and reacting on each other, would tend to harmonize, and
the proposition of one v"-uld become the proposition of all.
On some subjects we can find out definitely Uorris' at-
titude. Even in his first attempt at government making, Morris
was in favor of a strong executive. The ruling tendency of all
constitutional bodies of that time \"as to curtail the power of the
executive, much in the sr.me manner as they had desired to curtail
the power 'f the royal executive. The Tew York convention tried
to carry out that idea of a weak executive by making the executive
a board of men In -nlace of e single man, thus dividing the author-
ity and the responsibility. Morris, m.ore clear-headed than his
fellows, saw the fallacy in trying to weaken an executive who de-
rived his office and his power directly from the peor)le. One
limitation on the executive pov;er was to vest the aripointivr rov^er
in a Council of Appointment composed of the governor aua lOur
senators, riorris was at first induced by Jay to assent to the
plan(2). ITbrris later realip.ed the weakening effect that tho
(1) Carter and St one , Reports of the Convention of 1821, 691-692.
(2) Jay, Correspondence (Johnston ed. ) , I, 128. Jay to Living-
stone and Morris, ^pril, 1777: " I spent the evening of that day
with Mr. Morris at your lodgings, in the course of which I proposed
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Council would have on the executive; therefore he roxusea to sup-
port the plan, and rroved that the governor "be aliowea to appoint
without the consent of the Council fl). This motion v/as defeated, i
and the uouncil adopted as Jay had conceived it. Another limita-
tion was -olaced on the executive hy the estahlishment of a Council
of Revision, composed of the governor, ohe chancellor, and the
judges of the Supreme Court, which was to he given the veto power.
T;Torris had urged the adoption of a limited veto in the governor
himself, hut was overruled hy the Convention (2). After that, '
he T^adc no opnositicn to the adoption of the Council of Revision.
Morris wap not entirely satisfied with t?ie Ilew York C f^nstitution
when it was finally adopted, and one great cause of his dissatis-
'f'&ction was that these councils deprived the executive of the
vigor which he should have. He so expressed himself to Hamilton,
who agreed with him in that particular.
Morris' interests in the Constitution were not confined
to the executive department, "but v;ero equally distributed through-
out the whole frame of government. It was he who invented the
plan whereby delegates were elected to the Continental Congress (3).
Each house was to nominate a -full list of delegates, and those on
both lis'*s were to be considered elected. TJhere the lists differ-
ed, the selection v/as to be made by joint ballot. Morris did not
the plan for the institution of the Council as it novv stands, and,
after conversing on the subject, we agreed to bring it into the
House the next day."
(1) Lincoln^ Constitutional Eistory of New YS rk, I, 533.
(2) Lincoln, ^onptituti onal History of New York, I, 505.
!
(3) Ibid, I, 537.
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believe in ;.ny especial restraints on the legislature, but urged
that a simple majority should constitute a quorum (1).
Although Morris has been called a redical at this per-
iod, he is often found remaining true to his aristocratic heritage.
This is rell illustrated by the part he ^^layed in fixing the qual-
ifications for suffrage. In the old colonial days a man had to
own a freehold worth forty pounds before he was allowed to yote(2),
nnd up to the r^evolution the unfranchised had exhibited no discon-^
tent (3). About 1775 the Assembly, loyalist in tone, did not
offer opr)osition to Great Britain in the manner, v/hich the more
radical colonists desired; therefore the dissatisfied people
began to take control of affairs into their ovna hands. Committees
of Gorrespi^ndence were self appointed by the leaders. These in
turn called for elections of various committees which became extra-
legal governing bodies. At first these committees were in control
of the conservatives, and they shOY/ed no disposition to give
the radicals ' v;ho v/ere generally at this time the unfranchised)
any voice in the control of the committees. Thus a contest devel-
oped between the aristocratic conservatives and the unfranchised
radicj^ls as to whether the franchise should be extend^^d or not.
Since no n^w legislation wa.« -passed on *he, subject, - they cnm.e to
no de'^inite conclusion. As "' ong as the conservatives were in abso-
lute control, they decided agaist the unfranchised. However, as
time went on, the strength of the radicals increased until they
had absorbed i-^ractically all the conservatives who had not turned
fl) Lincoln, OOn stitutional History of New York, I, 516.
f 2) McKinley, Suffrage franchise in the :^ngli8h Colonies, 213.
(3) Becker, Political Parties in the Province of IJew York, 15.
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loyalists fl).
Thus the Convention was in control of the radicals, hnt
moderated to some degree by the conservative element which they
had absorbed. The extreme radicals were quick to seize the oppor-
tunity to secure an extension of the franchise, and introduced
a resolution that a mere freehold, of any value, would give a man
the franchise* If Morris had been in perfect accord with the rad-
icals fee would have offered no opposition. Since he was still
somewhat of an aristocrat with conservative policies, he offered
an amendment that the freehold must be at least worth twenty
pounds before a man could vote. This amendment vms adopted, and
became part of Ihp Constitution (2).
Morris made every effort to havo an article adopted,
which recommended to future legislatures that they take effectual
measures for abolishing domestic slavery, as soon as it could be
done consistently with public safety and the rights of nrivate
narties (3). He had the support of Jay and many other members of
the Convention in his ef "nrts to have the article adopted ,biit
it did not have S';f-^icient su"oport to pass, and, therefore, was not
incor'^orated in the GonFtitutioh.
The Constitution was finally adopted on Sunday, Ariril
20, 1777 (4), and with that act went into effect, since there was
no '^revision for submitting it to popular vote. The new govern-
ment yet lacked organization, and a committee of i-.lorris. Jay, Scott,
Livingstone,, Yates, and Hobart was appointed to . tart the govern-
^1) Becker
, Political Parties in the Province of ITevir York, 120.
(2) Lincoln, Constitutional History of New York, I, 514.
f3)lbid, I, 553.
f4)lbid, I, 558.
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ment in oneration fl)» TJorris was also raade a me;-aber of the Goim^
oil of Safety, which was insHtiited as the governing boiy until
the elections oould be held.
New York had not been left in peace and quiet to adopt
and put in operation her Constitution. The very Convention which
had adopted the Constitution had be^n forced to flee from place
to place to avoid the British (2). ITow all Nexv York was again
endangered by the advance of Biirgoyne in his campaign of 1777. The
Council of Safety was filled with alarrs by the wild rumors of
northern disasters. Morris and states were ar)T:)ointed to go north
to the array and confer v^ath General Schuyler as to the best means
of defence (3). Morris immediately joined the army, and began a
correspondence with the Council of Safety on the military condi-
tions. Mis information was? not very definite, and his vague ex-
pressions of disaster and depredations did little to cuiet their
apprehensions. The people were a],so clamoring for news; therefore
the Council suggested that they desired more full and -precise in-
formation
,
and that r.lorris includo some paragraphs '^'or the public.
T!orris did not take kindly to the suggestion that he write to ap-
nease the curiosity of the rublic; therefore he replied in a- some-
what r)etulant manner; " We have received yours of the 19th, vv'hich
offered us great pleasure, since we vore enabled in some measure to
collect from it our errand to the northv.'ard, one of the important
objects of our journey 'being in the opinion of your honorable
(1) Sparks
,
I, 128.
f2) Lincoln, constitutional History ot" Nev>r York, I, 491-492.
(3) Sparks, I, 130.
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board to write the nev/s'.''fl) Shortly after this IJorris returned,
prepared to give all reo isite information to the Council of Safe-
ty".
Schuyler hadd "been in corninand of the army during this
part of the campaign , bnt the repeated disasters and his unpopu-
larity with the New England troops induced Congree to re-nlace him
with Gates (2). Morris took up Schuyler's cause at the "beginning
of the trouble, and even ^vent down to Philadelphia to intercede
for him. On his dismissal Tuorris wrote him, expressing sympathy,
and asking him to sink all personal feeling and consider only the
common weal of the country (3). xJorris
,
himself, always acted on
that proposition; and, although he disliked the manner in which
Gates h?d attained his oomF.and, once he had "been appointed Morris
gave him ?.ll the support in liis pov^rer. (4)
(1) Sparks, I, 134.
(2) Ghanning, History of the Tnited States, III, 267.
f3) Sparks, i, 141.
(4) Roosevelt, Gouverneur Morris, 73,
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III. Public Services Under the Confederation
.
The time had now oorne when T.Torris was to be taken from
the narrov/ field of his early activities, and given a place in the
affairs of the nation. New York recognized the national scope of
his talents (l), and eleotod him as delegate to the Continental
Congress
,
wnere ne took his seat on January 20, 1778 f2).
This was the winter that the army endured such dreadful
suffering at valley "'orge. Not only was the army in a bad v/ay
beoa-use of the lack of nroper lood, ciotnmg, and hrusing, Dut it
had no assurance tnat the conditions wo-^^ld be remedied. The gen-
eral organization oi the army mas a more or less haphazard affsir,
nnd oculd not handle a situation as pressing as tne one at valley
'^'orge. Washington constantly urged Congress to institute some
reform, and to this nnd congress appointed a committee or live to
re-nair to Valley T'orge and consult with 'iVashingt on.
fl) Jay, correspondence ( Johnston ed. )
,
II, 147. Jay to Govern-
or Clinton : " It gave me much pleasure to near that Gouverneur
TTorris v^ould protBbly be in your delegation this fall* Indenen-
dent Of my rerrard lor nim, it appears to me of great imaportance
to the state that every valuaoie m.^n in it rnouid be preserved,
and that it ir^ par' icu iarly tc our interest to cnitivpte, cnerish,
and support such of our citizens, especially young and rising
ones, as are, or nromise to bo, anie and honest servants of the
public. " ,
(2) Journals or uongress, YI, .30.
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Morris was placed on this coraraittRe (1), and went at
once to Valley l^'orge. There he assiduously dpvoted himself to the
interests of the army, v/hich meant the interests of the commmder-
in-chief. The interests of Washington were evor the interests of
the army, and a man c 017 Id not worlr for one without working for
the otner. Morris was wise enough to cdopt without change the
{ 2
)
recommendations of Washington end ne labored so earnestly in
attempting to secure their adoption tnat "Vashington considered
him as the r.ersonal representative of his inter'^sts in Congress (3)
The most imonrtant measure to Washington was the one which secured
half pay to tne officers tor life. Morris strenuously advocf ted
the measure, nna in Tne end was r.artly victorious; but the value
of the m^issure was greatly reduced. Dy r-mondments wnich limited the
half r»ay to seven years (4).
Morris loct none of his self-assurance when he stepped
from the New York Convention into tne ir.ore important Continental
Congress; therefore Congress overawed him not at all. What little
respect he had for that body disfippeared oy tne time nis measures
had suffered from disapproval of Congress. He wrote to Jay: "The
mighty Senate of America is ntbt what you have Jmown it . Continental
(1) Journals of Congress, VI, 30,
(2) Roosevelt, uouverneur Morris, 7«,
(3) Washington, Vritings f?ord ed"^) VII, 17. Washington to Mor-
ris, T.^ay 18, 1778 -."The sooner eegimenxal regulation and other
arrangements are sot aooux, tne ;^ooner tney will oe finished, and
for God's sake, my dear Morris, let me recommend to you to urge the
ah solute necessity of this measure with all your might."
(4) Journals of Congress, vl, 159.
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Oongros3 and currency have "both deprociat od" ( 1) . Much of this
feeling had been inspired in Morris by the shoddy way that Cong-
ress had treated the array. In his letters to ^^ashington T'^orris
was very frank in his disapproval of Congress. His energetic,
impetnous temperament could not bear the dilatory tactics of that
body. He wrote to V7ashington in Tlay, 1778 Had the several
members, who compose our multifarious body, be.en only wise, our
business would have be'^n long since completed. But our superior
abilities, or the desire to appear to possess them, leads to such
an exquisite todiousness of debate, that the most precious moments
pass away unheeded like vulgar things"(2).
Because of his interest in the affairs oi xhe army,
Morris was put on practically every committee which had cnarge
of m.ilitary matters. The nam.e
,
military, im.pilies no unity to this
kind of work, however, for v/e find him one day remedying abuses
in the medical department, and .the next day arranging for an ex-
change of prisoners (3) . Morris was also on many other important
committees, many of which dealt with the finances. He was keenly
alive to the defects of governmeiit
,
and in 1778 drew up a long
paper on the condition of the country. He took up in detail both
the financial system and the organization of the army, showing
the defects, and proposing a remedy. One of his proposals, v'hich
he did not scon forget, was that a treasury, navy, and commerce
board should be established, together with an executive committee
>
(1) Jay, Correspondence ( Johnston ed.), II, 174.
(2) Washington, Writings f ^ord ed.), VII-, 29.
(3) Sparks, I, 153.
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of government fl) . Later, in the ooiirse of the dehat-es in the
federal Convention, it was he who proposed a somewhat similar
group of executive officers (2),
Morris also took a deep interest in the foreign rela-
tions of the Confederation. After the failure of Burgoyne and the
empty victory of Howe in Pennsylvania, the British ministry "began
to despair of a sucessful termination of the war. 'therefore.
Lord North hrought forward his famous Conciliatory Bills, v/hich
gave the colonists almost everything but independence (3). These
bills r/ere, on their arrival, referred by Congress to a committee
of which Morris was the chairman. This committee lost nc time in
presenting a report v/hich declared that the colonists would not
treat with peace commissioners unless the British troops were with-
drawn, or the independence of the colonies recognized (4), When
the British Commissioners arrived, they met with but little bet-
ter reception than the bills which preceded them. Their mission
ended in total failure because of the unpopular basis on which
they wished to treat. Gouverneur Korris played a chief part in
the whole affair, and most of the reports and resolves, which were
issued from time to time, came from his pen (5). At the close of
the affair he was one of a committee to draw up an outline of the
whole proceedings, entitled " Observations on the American 'devo-
lution It was a clear and comprehensive account of the ur ogress
(1) Sparks, I, 16E.
(2) ]?arrand. Records of the '^'ederal Convention, II, 342.
(3) Van Tyne, The American Revolution, 231-233.
(4) Journals of Congress, IV, 165.
(5) Sparks, I, 187.
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of the war and the attempts of Great Britain to secure ri«ace.
Morris' second great service in the field of diplcnacy
was as chairman of a committee to consider certain important dis-
patches from the American Commissioners abroad and certain commun-
ications from the French Minister in the United States. The report
of this committee may he considered as the basis of the peace made
later, since it embraced all the essential points in the treaty of
peace as to boundaries, evacuation of military posts, fisheries,
navigation Of the Mississippi, etc fl). The report of this commit-
tee was kept up for discussion from February to August of 1778, in
which debate ITorris took a leading part as a harmonizer (2). 7/hen
the opinion of Congress had been definitely determined by this long
debate, Morris was given the task of embodying the prevailing views
in a draft of instructions to commissioners of peace later to b» ap-
pointed. His draft was adopted by Congress without change (3).
Although Morris' greatest devotion v;as to the inter-
ests of the army and to foreign affairs, he was activr? in many of
the minor affairs which Cfime before Congress. He was one of the
leaders in the very rn^arm debate which grew out of the controversy
between Silas Deane and Thomas Paine as to the formers negotiations
in Surope (4). As regards treaties, Morris was an advocate of con-
servatism, and urged that it v^as below our dignity to seek foreign
alliances before we had attained independence (5). He also mixed
fl) Secret Journals of Congress, II, 132-137.
(2) Sparks, I, 196.
(3) Ibid, I, 197.
(4) Ibid, I, 196-205.
(5) Ibid, I, ^05.
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Tip in th« disp-ata between Now York and Vermont. He refused to urge
the right of New York to control Vermont, and, as a result, he lost
many friends in his home state (1).
Morris had now served tv/o one year terns in Congress,
but, "becanso of the machinations of some small minded New York pol-
iticians, he was not re-elected in 1779. His enemies mit forward
the frivolous charge that he neglected the interests of the state
for those of the nation, which argument found favor with the states
rights men. His luke-warmness in the Vermont matter was also used
against him. The states-right politicians could not forgive him
for his broad nationr.listic attitude, simply because they could
not understand it. '•^'heir state was their world, and when a man
went out from it_ completely, they at once severed all connection
with him.
The work that Congress did during tnis period was pro-
digious, and the energetic Morris escaped none of the labors. Al-
though his greatest services were on special committees, he did
work just as necessary, but not so noticeable, as chairman of three
standing committees , —commissary
,
quartermaster, and medical de-
partment (2). On these committees he did all the Vvork. I.icrris, as
(1) Sparks, I, 212.
(2) Ibid, I, 217. In a letter of IJorris' : " I have no memoranda
of what passed during the war. I led then the most laborious life.
- - - _ - Not to mention the attendance from 11 to 4 in the House,
which was common to all, and the appointment to special committees,
viz., on the commissarie'i> , the quartermaster ' o , and the medical
department's. You must not suppose the members took any charge or
burden of affairs. Necessity, preserving the democratic forms,
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a personal representative of '.'Washington, rendered especial service
in coFbating intrigues against him. In what spare time Morris
had, he labored at his profession, since his wages as delegate
could not support him fl). Because of his prodigious labors,
Morris had no tiine to keep a record of his connection V7ith contem-
poraneous events; therefore what v/e know of his record in Congress
must be gleaned from the meagre journals of that body.
When Morris left Congress, he did not return to IJew
York, but established himself in his profession in Philadelphia.
Although he now became a private citizen, he by no means lost his
interest in national affairs. During the first part of i7fJU he
wrote several papers on the financial situation, attacking the
lav;s which forced people to accept paper money as legal tender (2).
He pointed out the errors of the states in their financial legis-
l8|.tion, and outlined a remedy in r. plan of taxation. He saw the
great defect of the Confederation was its lack of revenue powers,
and he said that after the v/ar ras over and its cf^ntralizing in-
fluence lost, the Confederation would become a mere rope of sand(o)
Morris Vvas not long destined to play the role of the
private citizen, for in the middle of 1701 he was made Assistant
assumed the monarchical substance of business. The chairman re-
ceived and answered all letters and other applications, took every
step which he deemad essential, prepared reports, gave orders and
the like, and merely took the members of the committee into the
chamber for form'j^ sake to receive their approbation. "
(1) Sparks, I, .:16,
(2) Ibid, I, 218.
f3) Ibid, 1,222.
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Financior under Robert Morris. The affairs of the naxion nad long
been in a rather ohaotio condition because of the ooranibueo system
for executive duties. This condition was remedied in IV^^l by the
establishment of the Departments of Foreign Affairs, Finance, vVar,
and Marine. Robert Morris
,
because of his experiencje in financial
matters and his ardor for the r>atriot cause, v/as put a^ the head of
the Department of Financed). In order that he might be free to
remedy conditions as he saw fit, he demanded from Congress a large
grant of powers, one of vvhioh vas that he might chose his own
assistants (2), As socn as Congress complied, Robert I'orris re-
quested Gouverneur's assistance in an office later to be created,
which assistance Gouverneur willingly promised (3). When Congress
created the office of Assistant Financier, Robert Morris appointed
Gouverneur in r letter which expressed high praise for his talents,
saying: "My entire conviction of the great and essential services,
which your talents, genius, and capacity enable you to render to
your country; and of that aid, ease, and confidence you can and wii;
administer to my own exertions and feelings, never left me for one
moment to hesitate about the ch'^ice I should make" (4) , Gouverneur
continued in this office until the beginning of 1785, vhen Robert
resigned.
During this period a large share of the arduous labor
of the department fell on his ehouldors, of which he acquitted
himself creditably. He had a good share in the establishment of
the "Bank of North A.merica ". The scheme originated in Robert
(1) Sparks, I, 231.
(2) Ibid, I, 235.
(3) Jay
,
, Gcrrespond ence ( Johnson ed. ) , ll, 36.
(4) Sparks, I, 233.

Morris and Alexander Hamilton, "but Gouverneur drew up the final
plan and also the otservaticns v^^hich acoompanied the plan to Cong-
ress fl). The bank at once had a v/onderful effect in restoring
public credit, and was invaluable in the assistance it rendered to
the Department of !*^inance.
Gouverneur Morris also had a hand in the development
of our nresent system of coinage. He drew up and presented to
Congress a report on the state of the foreign coinage then in cir-
culation, and to this report he added a plan of his own for a rys-
tera of coinage{2). The basis of this plan was the present system
of decimal notation, but the unit was very small because he v/ished
to be able to express any foreign coin in terms of the new unit.
This was a disadvantage since it required too many figures to ex-
press even small amounts. Therefore
,
when Congress took up the
subject of a monetary system, they did adopt I.Iorris' original idea
of decimal notation, but they discarded his unit and remaining
values.
Vi/hen Robert Llorris resigned in 1785, Gouverneur went
with him
,
and again took np the practice of law in Philadelphia.
He also engaged with Robert Morris in a series of commercial enter-
prises, which included shipments of tobacco to France, iron works
on the Delaware river, and a voyage to the East Indies (3). These
enterprises and the -nractice of law took up all of his time until
the meeting of the i?ederal Convention*
Until after 1787 Morris kopt no record of his corre^-
sprfldence; therefore all our knov/ledge of his views on ^Tiiblic
(1) Sparks, I, 235.
(2) Ibid, I, 273.
f3) Ibid, I, 266.
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matters cr of his relations ^vith his contemporaries must "be gathere
from the letter files of other men. These letters are not many, but
they express some of his most deoidecl opinions upon the pressing
issues of the time. '^e find in his letters to Washington and Green
some very caustic remarks on the manner in "-hich Congress dealt
with the array fl) . Morris early realized the inefficiency ©f
Congress, and he frankly expressed his disapproval of the way in
which they administered the government. He found especial fault
with the administration of foreign affairs. At one time he advised
Jay to refuse his appointment as one of the American commissioners
of peace because Congress instructed him to be governed by the ad-
vice of the French Ministry (2). The proud and haughty spirit of
Morris rebelled at suoh servility, and to him the only way out of
the situation was to decline the post. Jay decided differently as
to the means, but he attained the sam.e end by breaking the. instruc-
tions.
(1) Sparks, I, 165
(2) Jay, Correspondence (Johnston od. ) , II, 38.

IV A MeraTjer of the Federal Convention .
Morris early sav/ the need of a strong nnion in place
of the Confederation, which he likened to a rope of sand. His ex-
perience in Congress and in the ^^epartment of finance taught him
that such as inefficient government could not last long. He con-
stantly reproached Congress for its lack of material accomplish-
ments, and although he war? in Congress when the Articles of Con-
federation were adopted, he never strongly advocated the system
of government that they estahlished. He had hopes, however, that
"before long the states wmild grant more power because he wrote to
Jay : " True it is the general government wants energy, and equal-
ly true is it that the want will eventually he supplied fl) .
Morris relied on the evil conditi'^ns hrou;?ht about by the weakness
of the Confederation to force the states to amend the Articles.
He wrote tc Jay in 1783 : I think it probable that much of con-
vulsion rill ensue, yet it must terminate in giving to government
that power without which government is but a name " (2) . Again
in the sam.e year he wrote to Jay : " nothing can do so much good
as to convince the Eastern end Southern states how necessary it is
to give proper force to the federal government, and nothing will
so soon operate that conviction as foreign efforts to restrain
navigation " (3)
.
Morris was correct in his optimistic view that more
(1) Jay, Correspondence f Johnston ed.). Ill, 104.
(2) SToarks, I, VA9,
(3) Ibid, I, 259.
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power would in time hf^ given to the general government, and -it' he
was alGO correct in that it was the weakness of the government
Tinder the Articles of Confederation which compelled the additional
grant of powers. Money Irouhlcs wore the chief evils of the gov-
ernment. There wae no power to force the i^s.yment of taxes, and
Congress co'ild not collect its requisitions. Various states pass-
ed crude financial measures which only made the economic discon-
tent worse, and -finally actual rebellion hmke out in I.'assabhusetts
"ach state distrusted the others, and sought to benefit itself at
the expense of the general government. This interstate jealousy
made it impossible to secure the grant of any additional powers
to the general government by way of amendment of the Articles.
One of the greatest causes of the friction between
states was the difference in commercial regulations. In an effort
to settle these differences, Virginia and ^'^aryland met in a conven-
tion at Alexandria in 1785. This convention accomplished its im-
mediate purpose so well that Virginia invited all the states to
meet in ''ay of 1796 at .\nnapoiis ''to take into consideration the
trade of the United States, to examine the relative situation
and trade of the said alstes " f 1) . The meeting at Annapolis was
thinly attended, and no state except Virginia sent a full repre-
sentation. However , resolutions were drafted by Hamilton, who at-
tended from Hew York, and were sent out to p11 the colonies. These
resolutions outlined the de ects of the Articles and the desirabil-
ity of having them strengthened by h conven"! ion which ?hould re-
port to the state legislatures.
As a result of the above resolutions, elections v/ere
held in rest of the states for delegates to a convention to meet
(1) Ohanning, A History of the United "tates. III, 472.

in Philadelphia in May of 1787. Goiiverneur llorris, having resided
in Philadelphia for seven years, was considered a citizen of ?enn- '
sylvania, v.nx\ v;as elected as onn of the delegates from that stated'.
The frarners of the 3o istitution of the United
-tates
assembled in the month of Llay, 1787, amid difficulties and embar- i
rassments of the ^rost extreme kind. In the first place, notwith-
standing the weakness of the Confederation, many people were at-
tached to that form of government. Many people did not believe i
it possible ^o better the situation by the means proposed. Some
said it was n^t wise; others doubted the likelihood of any useful
results; others even doubted the legality of the Convention. In
truth the country had come to no united opinion as to what could or
what should be done. However, the unhappy circuiLStances of the
trials, sufferings, and difficulties that the country had gone
through v;ith in the years im]-!ediately preceding 1787 were keenly
apT^arent to all. By the "^crce of such adversity, and in an attemnt
to make some. effort to avoid it in the future, the majority in
most of the states finally gave their approval to the Convention.
One of the rihief obstacles in the path of the success
of the Clonvention r.-as a lack of suitable models on which to bnild
the franev'ork of government. Europe coulr^i o^^'er little help. The
British Constitution, although its advantages were well known, did
not suit the taste and temper of the people whose fundamental
principle v;as that F;overeignty was in the rieople. The very name
monarchy had a repellent sonnd to the masses. 'i-he state consti-
tutions offered some help, but they were on too small a scale to
inclTJde the diversified interests which the national Constitution
must include. At that time the world had never witnessed the
meeting of the deputies of a nation chosen by the people for the
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purpose of esta"blishing a government in its entirety. i"^o man had
ever conceived, such a colossal iindertaking even in theory, fhere
were some political theorists in ii^urope who considered the state
of society and the relation of the sovereign and E-abjoct, and upon
particular events discussed the right of the people to dethrone a
bad monarch or to resist tyranny. However, this body had to go
farther than that, build a governi^.ent from the fundamentals up, and
decide as to the best mode of the arrangements and distribution
of povers. it was nrx tnat they created any nov element of govern-
ment
,
becaiise in the history ot tne colonies, the mother country,
and the Oonfederaticn, ve can find tJie origin of practically every
proposition; but the stupendous undertairing of building up a .o-ov-
ernment piece by riece, even if the material was at nanc; , was one
tnat the ^-orld had never before witnessed.
Another great diiiiculty that the Convention had to con-
tend with was tiie diversitied interests represented in its person-
nel. But few men r^^aiized the meaning of the word union in its fui:
significance. Special interest naa unselfishness crov;ded out of
the creed of the average d'^iegRte. ^Jtate jealo^;3ies 7;ore rife,
depending not only on oomparitive size, but also iipon location
and economic development. So we fina tne large state party opposed
to the small etate loarty; tne north againnt the sonth; and the ag~
riculti^ral class opposed to the oomrerciPi class. ?iach class ral-
lied to the ^Trotection of its ovra mtrrests, caring nr.t now other
states might suf7:er. it was only oy coraproraisns, urged by the most
disinterested and xrr-seeing of the r-emibers, that the 'Jonstitution
was finally evolved.
It is notieeable that the men who were the mopt dis-
interested, wno were the most iinselfish, and wno looked not so much i
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to the interest of the few as tc the good of the many, were the men
who ranked as the leaders of the Convention. The men vjno labored
for a special interest, v/hether siioessful or not, V7ere not mmbered
among the most prominent statesmen. ^hey may have had great ahilitji
and great infliience, but beca^Tse of the misuse they made or their
i
talents, they are relegated to comparitive obscurity.
The Convention inolrder? in its roll many men of marked
quality. Some one has aaid 'hat of the tv^^o great periods in our
;
history the Civil War brought forth great generals, while the period'
of independence brought forth great statesmen, '^hat v.^hich the
time especially demanded was produced in each instance. To see
us through the troublous times of our birth the nation demanded
great statesmen, and one o^ the results of their labors was the
Constitution, The government had to be built from widely scattered
materials, and in the face of opposition by many different interests
To pjurmount these difficulties we had men in the Convention who com-
bined a "profound knowledge of the science of government v;ith an
acute sense of justice, and the qualities of magnanimous patriotisc
Th^y were men who rose above 9.11 loeal and narrow objects, and who
embraced in the scope of their vi.';ion the welfare of the whole na-
tion.
George V/ashington is first on the list of the great men
in the Convention. He had not been eager to fare forth into pub-
lic life once more, but ho '"inally went since he was made to feel
that much depended on his presence and support. He was elected
President of the Convention,— a most fortunate selection,^as his
powers in debate were feeble, but the rasre knowledge of his opinion
as Presideni would have great influence. Washington's friendship
with Morris dated back to 1776, when ilorris met him in New York as

a member of a v/eloorcing delegation from the Provincial Congress of
New York. This friendship became strengthened by Llorris' inval-
liable services to t}ie General and to the army while Morris was in
the Continental Congress. Throughout the war they kept up a steady
correspcndence on the affairs of the nation, Horris always exhibit-
ing a profound respect for the opinions of the elder man. An
amuvTing incident is told of one time when IJorris presumed on his
intimacy with 'Vashington. Washington was noted for his reserve,
even to his most intimate friends; but Morris made a wager with !
Hamilton that he could bo an familiar with Washington as v/ith any
of his friends. At one of the receptions 'Washington gave during
the stay in Philadelphia, Morris attempted to carry out the wager
by cominginand familiarly slapping "Washington on the back. Morris
in telling of it afterward said : "Ee did not speak, but the maj-
esty of the American people was before me. Oh, his IroK. How I
wished the floor would open and I could descend to the cellar. You
know me
,
and you know that my eye would never quail be i ore any-
other mortal " (l) . The friendship of these two men was of the
most personal sort, for »''ashington often records in his diary
the hours he s-nnnt in company with Morris at dinners, in drives,
and even in fishing trips takeniS). Their opinion on constitution
making coincided to some extent, for V/ashington favored a strong
federal government and a national sovereign (3).
With the second great figure of the Convention, Alex-
ander ^^amilton, Gouverneur Morris also had a very intim.ate rela-
(1) ?arrand. Records of the federal Convention, III, 36 note.
(2) Washington, Writings ( J?ord ed. ), ZI, 150.
(5) Ibid, XI, 150.
;

tionehip. Alexander Hamilton v/as undoubtedly the greatest states-
man in the Convention. The tangiljle results of his efforts are
small "beoanse he v:a3 outvoted in his ovvTl state delegation. How-
ever, the value of the disinterested and patriotic efforts he made
to secure the test possible government can not be measured,
had a deep knowledge of both past governments and the government
of his own country, and also a profound insight into the principles
of political science. He leaned toward the British Constitution
in that it typefied a strong^ centralized governmenx, under which
he believed the blessings of liberty and the natural rights of
mankind could best be secured. He realized keenly the evil effects
of slate attachments, and he saw the need of an efficient nation
al sovereign. lie had no narrov/ political or economic iiiterests
to serve, and he labored only in the interest of good government.
Morris' connection with Hamilton began wh'^n ne was in
the -Provincial 'Congress of Hew York, and there began to carry
on a correspondence on the ?^ffairs of the army fl). Both were
young men deeply interested in public affairs, and both nad some-
what similar views on government. '.Vhen the first Constitution
of Nev/ York was adopted, Morris sent Hamilton a copy of it with his
ideas as to its defects(2). Concerning the Constitution Morris
wrote : " I think it deficient for want nf vigor in tne executive,
unstable from the very nature i:irpular govenment , and dilatory
from the com^^lexity of the legislature "(3). Hamilton agreed to
the first and last propositions, but disagreed witn tr'e second
fl) Sparks, I, 145.
(2) Hamilton, "orks (Lodge ed.), VII, 477.
(3) Hamilton, Works (Hamilton ed.
) ,
I, 27.
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for he wrote -."That instability is inherent in the nature of popu-
lar government I think very disputable.- - - - - A ropresentative
democracy, -where the right of election is well securer' ana regu-
lated, and the exercise nf the eSiecutive, legislativo, and judic-
ial authorities is vested in select persons , chosen really "but not
nominally by the people, will, in r.y opinion, "d? most likely to
be happy, regular, and durable" (l) . In his opposition to a rad-
ically popular government Morris here se^-med to go farther than
even Hamilton, vhose theories are considered as approaching nearesi
a. monarchial form of governnent.
7/hen luorris became Assis-^-ant -financier, he again enter-
ed V7ork which brought him into clrse contact with Hamilton, for
^^amllton v/as very much intorested in finGncir.l matters, and kept
up a -constant correspondence v;ith the Department of finance. He
offered many suggestions in the plpn o-p the 3ank of IJnrth America.
In the later corresprnd^ncn between Gouverneur Morris and Hamilton
v,^e find frank discussions of the political topics of the times.
Morris com.bats the establishment of another nank, but Hamilton did
not think it so harm.ful
,
and advises a coalitirn (2). Hamilton
tells 0*' the deplorable legislative conditions in I'ew York, and
in one letter asks for advice from IJorris on some matters of bank-
ing (3). The v^hole oor^-esp' md '^rcr sho^"S •*:bn+ a close personal
friendship existed betr.een the tv/o men. Because of the similsirity
of their earlier vievvs, it is not sur-orising to find Hamilton and
Korris striving for the r^^ne strong, c-ntr" ii zed , almost nonarchie.l
(1) Hamilton, "7orks(Lodge ed.), VII, 164.
(2) Ibid, YIII, 161. i
(3) Ibid, VIII, 164.
'
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government in ihe Federal Oonvention •
Morris was n"t po olor-^iy ornnected v/ith the other prorn-i
inent statesmen cf the Convention as he wap v/ith '.Vashing' on and '
Hamilton. There \va£^ Madison, not a ran of hrillij-mt s i.a oesman:-hip
;
like Hamilton, but one, nevertheless, of imminent taicnx and ahil- '
ity. He spent mnch lime in preparing for the work pi me Conven-
tion hy a stiTdy or r-a^t constitutions snd political theories. In
addition to his theoretical knowledge, he A-as well equipped prac-
tically by his experience in the Gtate Legislature, in the Con-
tinental Congress, and in the Constitut i cnal Conventirn of Virgin-
ia. Kadison early in tne Convention came to recognize the abil-
ity of Morris, and the two labored together on many propositions.
V/ilson and ^^ranklin, two other learlers in tne conven-
tion, were in Morris' delegation. iViloon was one ox i,ne xeading
jurists of tnat time, mid for six oi^t of twelve year- uad neen a
member ot tne Continental Congress fl). To hi- tne xenamg de-
fect of the Confederation wae the doctrine of states' right s , and
he used his greatest efforts to secure its elimination by the
adoption of proportional representation. ^et, on that c^uestion
xvhere he was the leader, Morris waF the last to give up the fight
for proportional representation in the upper branch (2). frank-
lin may be called one of the prominent mien in the
.
Convention be-
cause of the weight given to his opinions by his fellow members.
He had some extreme and peculiar idear, but because of the regard
with which men held him, the Convention listened ith the greatest
respect when he spoke. Then often, when the debate became miOst
fl) Curtis, Constitutional History, I, 308 !
f?) Farrand, >;ecords of f he :''ederal Convention, II, 25,
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heated, it was Dr, franklin who reminded the members that they
were there to consult and not to Gontend(l). V/ith yet another
Piember of the Pennsylvania delegation, Robert LIrrris, Gr^uverneur
Morris was closely connected. He had served as Assistant Financier
under Robert Morris for three years and a half^ and later the two
had been partners in the business world, which relation was still
existing at the time of the Convention.
There were many other men r/hose presence meant well for
the Convention. Randolph and I'ason frori^ Virginia were both men
of note and influence; from I'-ai-^sachusetts came t?iat brilliant or-
ator and statesman, x^ufus King; South Carolina sent Rutledges and
the Pinckneys; Prom Connecticut came Ellsworth and Sherman; and
from Delaware came Dickenson. These were the men who were to have
the leading part in shaping the destinies of America.
Morris was well equipped for the work he was about to
begin." He had the training of a lav/yer, to which he had added
legislative and executive experience. Morris had been in the
state legislative bodies during the early oart of the war and in
the national
.
legislature in the later oeriod, where he had devel-
oped clear ideas as to the working relation between the general
and state golzrernments. He was a member of the first Constitutiona!
Convention of I^ew York, and took a very important part in the
shaping of the instrument there produced. There, because of the
distrust of the people, he had to be content with less than he de-
sired in the way of a strong, centrali zed government. The mere
fact that he was instrumental in the building of one government
was invaluable when it came 1 o undertaking the same thing on a
fl) ?arrand. Records of th^ Federal Convention, II, 189. !
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larger scale. Morris had iDeeij on three of the executive committees
of the Continental Congress where he full opportunity to realize
the inefficiency of a government conducted in that manner. His
later connection of three years with the Department of B^inance gave
him a yet deeper insight into the weakness'is of the Confederation.
In addition to this practical experience in government, Morris
had made some study of past constitutions, and his speeches in
the Federal Convention show a wide knowledge x)f history.
As has been said, tne Convention embraced in its mem-
bership the representatives of many special interests, from which
list but few men could be excepted. Morris was different from
most of his contemporaries only by the fact that his allegiance
to special and class interests was not so strong, and also by the
fact that he was usually able to disregard such allegiance when
the best interests of the country demanded it. These special
interests were due in a large part to tne influence of his birth,
his location, and the economic class to which he belonged.
Morris was born into the aristocracy of Hew York, and
he remained true to his breeding. The only t-me he absolutely
deserted his clasr was during the Kevolution,when his love of lib-
erty and treodom made him align with the radicals as opposed to
the aristocratic conservatives. After the war was over, Morris
found that nis interests no longer coincided with the radical group,
He could not favor their popular commercial restrictions, whicn so
well expressed the radical views. He was now clearly on the side
of the conservatives, and eager to use all his influence against
radical legislation (1). He expressed his idea of the class he
fl) Sparks, I, 271.
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opposed in a letter to Jay where he speaks of "those turbiilent
spirits who wish for confusion and he said that" in the regular
order of things they oan oniy till a subordinate sphere " fl).
Morris in the Convention expressed his disapproval of the estab-
lishment of an aristocracy (2), but his actions belied his words.
He was at heart an aristocrat absolutely opposed to democracy, Mad~
ison wrote to Hparks years after the Convention : "He (Morris)
certainly did not incline to the democratic side. - - - - ge con-
tended for certain articles capable ri protecting the rights of
property against the spirit of Democracy " (3). Morris' aristo-
cratic tendencies are plainly visioie in rest of the things he did
in tne Convention, particularly in nis work in the establishment
of the legislative and executive departments
. He was never in
favor of a purely popular government, and when the New York consti-
tution was being considered, he wrote to Hamilton that he believed
popular elective governments unstable from tneir very nature (4) ,
He came to the convention seeJ^ing this element of staDiiixy, wuicn
he believed could oe best secured under an aristocratic government.
Morris' economic interests were also instrumental in
shaping his course. I'hese interests arose aiier ne had moved away
from the lana.noiding class oi uew York and had become connected
with the commercial classes of Pennsylvania. -Beard finds that
Morris' economic interests were represented by his holdings in
mercantile establishments, manufacturing, and shipping, all holdings
fl) Jay, Writings f Johnston ed.). Ill, 104.
(E) Beard, Economic Interpretation of the Constitution, 151.
f3) Farrand, Records of the Federal Convention, III, 499.
(4) Hamilton,Y/orks f Hamilton ed)
,
I, 27.
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in personalty as opposed to agrarian holdings (1), It was the agra-
rian class which was behind the paper money movements, and Morris
had begun his opposition to them before he v/a' s ont of his teens.
He combated a paper money bill in the New York Assembly in 1769,
and he kept np his opposition to similar bills throughout the years
of frenzied paper money legislation. Madison in his letter to
Sparks quoted above ,mentions Morris' allegiance to property inter-
ests. His support of property was well shown in the Nev^r York
Constitutional Convention, ^-^ere he secured freehold suffrage in
the face of radical proposals to remove all restrictions on suffrage
The class of personalty holders that Beard lay so much emphasis on,
the holders of public securities, did not list Morris as one of
their number (2)
.
Morris' location in the states, that is, in the north
and in a large stpte, was also influential in determining the in-
terests that he represented. His northern sentiments were shov/n in
many instances. His defense of the rights of -nersonalty can be
Toartly attributed to northern influence, as most of the wealth
represented by personalty was in that section. His opposition to
slavery, which had been begun in the New York Constitutional Conven-
tion, was northern in sentiment, although not essentially so. Mor-
ris was willing to restrict the South and the West in order that the
North might predominate in the governmental councils. He was not
interested financially in the V/est, but belonged to that class
which opposed the West at every opportiini ty . As a representative
of a large state he was bmmd to protect the interests of the large
fl) Beard, Economic Interpretation of the Constitution, 151.
;
(2) Ibid, 133.
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state party, and he did so oonsistently
.
It is evident that Morris went into the federal Conven-
tion owing allegiance to many special and class interests. Summar-
!
izing; he was a member of the aristocracy and conservative classes;
;
he represented 'business" and money interests as opposed to agra-
rian interests, bnt he was not interested in public securities; '
he wap a northerner; he was a member of the large state party; and
he was op^^osed to an extension of power io the West.
The influence of these special interests was not enough
to blind Morris to justice and the needs of his country. We find
him often disavowing allegiance to any party or interest, and urging
measures only on the grounds that it war for the best welfare of
America. The following extracts from his epeeches and letters ex-
press his sentiments as to class or sectinnal interest at three
different times in his life. In 1783 he v/rtbte to Jay -"The sov-
ereign acts weakly, a,'^ well as wickedly, if he cramps one part of tho
community that he may drain m.^^re easily the blood and juices from
another parf'fl). In the Federal Convention itself he said: " I
come here as a Representative of America; I flatter myself that I
come here in some degree as a Representative of the whole human
race. ----- I wish you gentleipen to extend ypur views beyond
the prenent moment of time, and beyond the narrow limits of place
from which you derive your political origin. If I believed some
things I havo heard, I voulrl suppose that we are assembled to truck
and bargain for our particular states. I can not descend to think
that any gentleman is really actuated by those motives "(2).
fl) Jay, Correspondencn ( Johnston ed.|. III, 86.
;
(2) ITarrand, Records of the federal Convention, I, 529.
\
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Finally, he wrote in a lettnr just berore he died : " But gentlemen,
let us forget party and think of our country. ----- jf our
country "be delivered, what 'does it signify whether tnose who oper-
ate her salvation wear a federal or a democratic oloak. It has been
the unvarying principle of my life, that the interest of our oountry
must he preferred to every other interest " (l). A man who profess-
ed to order his life by the above principles coTild not be influenced
unduly by any sectional or class interests. I^'o doubt the interests
he represented affected subconsciously his course of action, but not
enough to make him stray far from the -oath leading to the best pos-
sible gotiernment
.
Morris played a very prominent part in the Convention.
He was intensely interested in the science of government, and labor-
ed earnestly for the welfare of the nation; therefore he interested
himself in every question that came before the Convention, no mat-
ter how trivif9l it might be. He was a natural .rator, as V/illiam
Pierce said, " Morris was one of those geniuses in whom every spec-
ies of talent combine to render him conspicuous and flourishing in
public debate "(2). He made good use of this talent for debate, for
no man spokp more in the Convention than did Trouverneur Morris (3).
Pierce also said that no one had more wit, nor could engage the
attention more than I.Iorris; his brilliant intellect could discern
clearly the fundamentals of every argument, and bringing them to
light make the labor of reasoning " lazy and pleasing" to his
listeners, ^is princir^les v-ere usually permianent ones, but, never-
theless, if in tne course of the debate he saw the error of his
position, he ouickly admitted it.
fl) Sparks, III, 361. (2) ?arrand. Records, III, 92.
(3) Roosevelt, Couverneur I.Iorris, 139.

Morris believed in a strong national government. YJhen
he was first a member of the Provincial Congress of New York, he
had urged allegiance in all matters to the Continental Congress, a
position in advance of most of his contemporaries. During the per-
iod under the Confederation he constantly bewailed the lack of power
in tho national government, and he said that 1 hat very defect would
force a reform. He came to the Convention still more firmly in-
trenched in hiB nationalistic attitude, with a strong determination
to secure a powerful and permanent union in place of the loose fed-
eral league. In the fir^t few days of the Convention he pointed
out the distinction between a national and federal government,
the former having a compulsive and comr;lete operation, while the
latter was a mere compact resting on the good faith of the parties.
Morris urged that a supreme national government shoiild be establish-
ed fl). On this basis of desiring to establish a strong, central-
ized, national government Morris' work in the Convention must be in-
terpreted.
A large share of the work of the Convention was done by
committees, of which the three most important were the Committees on
Detail, on Unfinished Portions, and on Style. Morris was a member
of both the Committee on Unfinished Portions (2) and of the Coramit-
(3)tee on Style. The former was appointed the last of -ii gust, and con-
sidered many iri^ortant provisions. The biggest thing it handled
was the constitution of the executive
,
especially the method of e-
lection. This committee also retusec" to report a (Jrmcil of State,
and left the President supreme in his department, a fact which alone
fl)
(2)
T^arrand
,
?arrand
I, 34.
II, 473. (3) Farrand, II, 547
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made the government established noteworthy. The Committee on Styl
molded the Constitution into its pre:3ent form and phraseology,
li-here were five men on that committee, but the entire work jms turnip
ed over to Gouverneur Morris (l), and credit for the clear and
forceful language of the instrument must be given to him.
fl) ij'arrand, III, 419.

V. Services in the 5'edoral Convention.
The time set for the meeting o±' the Convention was
Uay 14, 1787, but on that day a quorum had not yet assembled. The
delegates present met and adjou' ned from day to day. D'inally on ::ay
25 a suffioiont number of delegates appeared to constitute a repre-
sentation from a majority of the states. On that day Gouverneur
Morris appears on the roll of the delegates (1) . He had been pres-
ent before, however, because I'ladison notes that ho was a leader
in some of the discussions which place before the Convention conven-
ed as to the plan of procedure (2) , Horris remained in the
Convention '-^nly a fovY days, and then he went to Hew "Tork, returning
agaixi on July 2. "^roin that tine on he v/as present contin-ijously^ ex-
cept for one or two days, until the Convention adjourned.
As soon as the Convention nad organized, Randolph
0T)ened the miain business by presenting a plan of government as a
basis for discussion. This plan v/as far in advance of the Articles
of Confederation. It provided for an i^xecutive, Legislative , and Ju-
dicial Departnent, proT";orti onal representation, extension of the
powers of thn national government, a negative on state lav;s, and
coercion of the states. 'i'he Gonvoni ion immediately resolved itself
into a Committee of the "'hole, and tooic the Randolph plan under
(1) ?arrand, I, 5.
(2) Ibid, I, 11.

consideration. Morris vvras nresent for only one meeting of the Com-
mittee of the V/hole. At that time he declared that a union of the
states merely federal v/oiild not accomplish the objects of common
defense, security of liberty, and general ^velfare; that no treaty
or treaties among the vhole or part of the states a.s individual
sovereignties would "be sufficient; but that a national government
consisting of a supreme Legislature, Executive, and Judiciary
ought to be established fl) . !Torris frankly disclosed that his
purpose was not one or amendment of the Articles of Confederation,
but rather one of establishing an entirely new government on the
basis cf the centralization of the national powers in one supreme
head.
The Committee of the V/hole kept the Virginia plan under
advisement until the 13th of June, v/hen it reported it to the Con-
vention (2). The national party was in control of the Convention,
and things were moving rapidly toward the establishment of a strong
governi^ent. Proportional representation lor both houses of a bi-
cameral legislature was rart or the plan as reported. A party
still remained which was opposed to any departure rrom tne prin-
ciples ot the Confederation, cind whose ideas were presented to the
conventi'-^n by I'atterson in tne r-iew Jersey plan (3). This plan en-
larged the powers of the national legislature, left the constitu-
tion of congress av=! it was imder tiie Confederation, and really
left tne sovereignties cf the states very little aiminished. Ham-
ilton also presented nis ideas on a constitutirn, vrnich instituted
fl)
(2)
(3)
<^arrand, I, 33.
Ibid, I, 223.
Ibid, I, 242.
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a government rn^^cli stronger nationally th.-:n one proposed in the Vir-
ginia -nlan. He believed in tenure tor good "behavicr tor the Sxec-
•utive and Senate, a large extension of legislative powers, and sub-
ordination of the states, notwithstanding the opposition to the
Virginia plan, it was reported to the Convention on Jirne 19 as the
basis of the plan of government (1).
The propositirns as rer^ortod b;^^ the (Jorrmittee of the
ViThole were again taken up one by one in the convention itself, and
the whole struggle between the opposing factions v/as repeated. The
t.uesticn as to proportional representation was not yet settled, al-
though tne small state party seemed in the minority. Finally on
^une 19, by six states to five, it was definitely decided a pro-
portional rule Tor representation in the first branch (2). No re-
versal 01 tnis decision was ever attempted. The rule of suffrage
for the second oranch yet remained to be decided, and i^llsworth
of Gonnectlcnt at. onco mov-^d for equal representation in the second
branch (3), expressing nip nopes of a compromise. The large state
party conid see no need or. reason tor a compromise, and warmly
urged the extenrlon of proportional representation to the second
branch. The Rmall states were desperate, and asserted that they
would never confederate on any ex^tept just principles, which to
them m'^ant eauai represenratiun m at least one branch. Bedford
even threatened a dissolution of tne confederation and an alliance
of the small states -.vitn some foreign power. All that day and
the next were spent in triiitless debRte. '^he motion of iilllsworth
finally cam.e to a vote on July 2, and resulted in a tie, five to
five.witn geo^gia divided. She Convention was ai full stop; there-
(1) Karrand, I, 315. (2) Ibid, I, 460. (3) Ibid, I, 468.
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fore a oominittee oi one trora eacn state v/as proposed and decjided
upon ( 1 )
.
Gouvernenr Morris had jnst xnis day returned to tne
convention
,
and ne tooit this opportunity xo maice an extended
speech on a variety of topics iS). Sparks related to i^^adison an
anecdote, wnicn nad ix tnat wnen Llorris returned to xne Gonvenxion,
he spoKe wlXh nuon eloquence and power on the necessity of union
and partial sacrifice, that he effected a change in the feelings
of the members, which was the means of restoring harmony and ulti-
mately effecting the objects of the Convention (3). I.Iadison re-
plied that Morris did speak at a critical time, but that his speech
was not one which changed matters in the least, because of the fix-
ed minds of the delegates, anci because of the substance of the
speech, containing, as it did, some of Morris' most disrelished
ideas f4). Although Morris often did subordinate his own views
and plead for harmony ana disinterestodness
, Madison was right in
saying that this was not one of those times. Morris had been ab-
sent during the consideration of the Virginia plan; therefore he
used this time to sketch over the whole plan of government and
to express his own views. He based his ideas on the need of stabil-
ity and permanence in govern
,
ent, and also on the need of combating
the vices, which he believed inherent in every human, with other
vices* He urged sn aristocratic Senate, holding office during life,
in order to separate the aristocratic interest and oppose it to the
democratic interest as represented in the more popular lower house.
He also contended that the Executive should appoint the Senate .
(1) B'arrand, I, 516. (2) Ibid, I, 511,. iZ>) Ibid, III, 498.
(i) -^bid, III, 500. i
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Since imder this plan the Senators would lose all state attachments
and could be taken froin any nlaoe, it would do away v/ith the need
of determining a ratio for representation. Recurring to the idea
that no inan was honest, he said that there would he no need to pay '
the Senators as they would pay themselves. He also said that the
Constitution could be forced on the people by bribing the popular
leaders with office. Such a speech could do little to settle the
immediate dificulty since it was neither directly on the rtoint,
i
nor was it a popular speech, fundamentally the speech was good be- '
bause it urged those essentials of a good government, stability and
permanence. Morris said, " A firm government alone can protect our
liberties"fl)
,
V/hen the Grand Committee of one from each state was ap-
pointed, its tiersonnel indicated that equal suffrage would win the
day. Gerry from Massachusetts, franklin from Pennsylvania, Davy
from North Carolina, and Baldwin from Georgia were not men who
would stand firmly for the rights of the large states. They were
the weaker members from those states
,
and were willing to com-
promise at once. Therefore, Qn July 5 the dommittee reported for
equal representation in the second branch, representation in the
first branch i^roportioned 1 to every 40, 000 inhabitants, and they
conceded to the large states that all money bills m.ust originate in
the ^irst branch f2). The large state party offered strenuoTis op-
position to this report. 't was no comr^romise to them. I^ven the
power of originating money seemed no concession on the part of the
small states.
In the matter of the re-triction of money bills Morris
(1) farrand, I, 511-hl4. f2i Ibid, I, 536.
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was especirtlly interestod, and he op-nosed th restriction to either
branch fl), expressing his disapproval of the clause -e7ery time it
came up f or consideration. Morris considered the Senate more cap-
able, ho-oed to see it aristocratic, and, therefore, was very much
averse to any decrease in its power. He was afraid that the House
would use this power to extort concession from the Senate in times
when appropriations v:ould be badly needed (2). His real reason
was a desire tc keep all mossible power in the Senate, but he ad-
vocated many others such as smaller number in the Senate, thus
added responsibility; -"nnecessary division of powers; and incon-
venience in operation. The clause was reported finally by the
Committee on Unfinishec Portions, but with a ri"-ht of amendment in
the Senate. Although Morris was on the committee, he gave notice
of his reservation of a right to later dissent to the clause .
He did secure a postponement, but was unable in the end to prevent
its adoption.
Morris also opposed the remainder of the compromise
which established equal representation in the Senate. He conceived
the whole thing to be against the best interests of the country,
in whose interest he declared he acted as a Representative of Amer-
ica. He wanted the members to extend Iheir views beyond the narrow
limits of the place from w'.ich they derived their political origin.
He expressed his disapproval of those v.'ho came to " truck and bar-
gain " for their respective states. Bedford had said that in case
the small states refused to agree, they woulfi ally themselves v\'ith
some foreign power. Llorris pointed out ths.t the people of the
(1) Farrand, I, 545. (2) J-bid, II, 297. (3) Ibid, II, 509.
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small states would soon follow their neighbors, and that if persua-
sion would not unite the country, the sword would. He painted with
pessimistio colors the results of civil war if the Convention fail-
ed. He concluded by saying; " State attachments and state impor-
tance nave be^n the bane of this country. I wisn that your ideas
could be enlarged to the true interest of nan instead of being
circumscribed within tne narrow compa.ss of a particular spot" (1).
But for all his plea for disinterestedness, his biting scorn of the
smnll state selfisnness, and his grim prophecy of civil war, the
adherents of equal representation v/ere not to be stayed.
The report was taken up clause by clause, xne one that
fixed the proportion in tne first branch at 1 to every 40,000 in-
habitants being the fir-t to cone up. This did not accord with the
views of Morris, .7ho was not going to sit by and see riroperty elim-
inated from tne apportionment of representation. He outlined the
basis of nis argument when he said ; " Life and liberty were gen-
erally said to be of more value than property. An accurate view of
the matter, nevertheless, would prove that property was the main
Object of society "(E). Morris was moved to urge this consideration
for property not only by his allegiance to the property holding
class, but also by his narrow-minded opposition to the West. He
endeavored in every way possible to curtail the influence of the
West in the government, and since' most of the property was in
the Atlantic states, a representation based on property would sub-
ordinate the 7est(3). The Oonvention refused to ef;tablish leg-
islative representation on a -oroperty ba^eis alone; therefore IJorris
«
(1) Farrand, I, 529-53E. (2) Ibid, I, 533. (3) Ibid, I, 533
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secured a ooraraitraent of the clans©, and he was elected chairman ct
the coraraittee which considered it fl). This committee brought in
a report Ju'y 9 which assigned a definite munher of delegates to
each st?ne fS). The mimhers given to the states were chosen ar-
bitrarily with the population and the wealth as a basis. However,
they had no definite figures, and the thing was arranged rather
haphazardly; therefore the clause was recommittod. ;Vhen the second
report vms brought in, the states began to haggle as to the exact
number of delegates that each state should get. It was another
case of truck and bargain, and again Morris pleaded with them to
forget state attachments and consider only the interests of the
whole comntry (3).
As soon as the report had been amended and adopted, a
motion was m.ade for a periodic census in order that the represen-
tation of the future could be apportioned on an exact basis. Here
Morris' aristocratic interests and his opposition to the V/est made
him oppose t'-ie r.otinn. If npportionment was left in the hands of
Congress with no restrictions, he had little fear but that that
body would keep the power in its own hands. He frankly avowed
his purpose was to keep the 'Vest out of the government as much as
possible (4)
.
WilliamGon introduced a new element when he amended
the clause so that representation should be apportioned to all the
whites and to three-fifths of the negroes (5). The South had fail-
ed in its first attempt to have the blacks counted as equal to the
whites, but was determined to secure som.e sort of representation
fl) ?arrand, I, 542'. (2) Ibid, I, 559.
(4) Ibid, I, 571. (5) Ibid, I, 581.
(3) Ibid, I 567
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for her negroes. Morris was opposed to counting three-fifths of
the negroes. He i^ointed out the logical difriculty in that if the
slaves were being counted as wealth, wealth should not he restrict-
ed to that one class of wealth; if the slaves were counted as pop-
ulation, all should be counted (1). Morris could feel that he
was figntlng a losing fight, for the c'etermination of the '^outh
was plainly apparent. In order, however, to stave off the end as
long as possible, he moved that ' taxation be proportioned to rep-
resentation''. This as a^Tided to include only direct taxation was
agreed upon (2). ^ven thn ntenace of increased contribution could
not stave off the 3outh, and she again domanded representation for
her blacks. The leaders saw the negroes must be coimted in the
end; therefore they directed their best efforts to the establish-
ment of a com^oromise. As the clause finally passod it provided
that both representation and taxation be pro-norti oned to the free
and three-fifths of all other inhabitants, and that a census be
taken every ten years.
i<andolph took advantage of the way things were going,
and moved that representation rest on numbers alone. ITorris was
on his feet in an Instant, voicing opposition to a proposition
which rould overturn his pet ^^rinciple of representation propor-
tioned to wealth. If Kandolr^hP motion passed it meant that part of
the werlth of the South was counted while that ox the ITorth was ex-
cluded. Morris could see as a result of the motion a union between
the "'est and the '''outh, leaving the ITorth in the minority. Morris
had always
. declined to see any division into Northern and Southern
interests, but now he said that he believed the gentlemen from
^1) ''^arrand, I, 583. (2) fbid, I, r92.

the South v/ould not be eatisfied until they saw a way open to gain-
ing a majority in the i-ublio onmcils. If the distinction between
the South and Worth was real " let us at once take a friendly leave
of each other V/ith the power in the hands o+" the South and the
interior country, he conld see no advantage to the North in confed-
erating fl). This speech was the farthest from deserving commend-
ation of B,ny :,lcrris delivered in the Convention. tienerally he
was patriotically disinterested and unselfish, striving to establish-
the best possible government under the circumstances. But things
had been going Dad with !!orris in the last ten days. He had stren-
uously opposed both tHe census and the representation for the slaves
,
but he had been defr>?^ted on both propositions.- Now by the adop-
tion of Randolph's resolution he was again defeated, and this
time on one of his pet theories, that representation should be pro-
portioned to wealth.
The final decision on the question of representation
in the secnnrt branch came on «^uly 15. Un the question of agree-
ing to the whole report, Inolurti rg the three-fifths compromise
and equality of state representation in the Senate, the vote was
five to four,-ith Massachusetts divided (2). The leaders of the
large state party had resisted the inevitable conclusion to the
last, but nov they accepted the vote with tha best possible grace.
They met before tne convention assembled the next morning, and de-
cided not to risk the future of tne convention by pgain urging
proportional representation ir botn nrancnes (3), Morris, however,
refused to be bound by any such decision, and on the morning of
July 17 he moved a reconsideration of the whole constitution of the '
(1) L''arrand, I, 603-505. (2) Ibid, II, 15. (3) Ibid, II 25.
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Legislative branch. It v:as the last feeble vrail of the large state
party, anri did not even get a second (1). Although the question
as to r^prep-ntation was settled, several minor qi^estions as to
the legislature yet remained to be decided.
in Congress if their delegates voted by states in the Senate and no-
per capita. It was to the interest of all men v.-ho opposed states'
rights, and who v;ished to limit the intlnenoe ot the states in the
Senate, to secnre a per cnnita vote in the Senate, Gerry had sug-
1
gested it, bi.it had made no definite proposal. Morris moved on JiJly
23 that the members of the second branch should vote per capita,
which was carried v/ith only Maryland in tne negative (2).
quality would exist in the Senate in s^oite of his opposition. It
was contrary to his principles of government, but bov/ing to neces-
sity he accepted the fact as it was. However, tne small states
not only wanted equality given to them, but they v/anted to be sure
tnat they rould not be deprived of tneir equality by any subse-
quent amendments. ''.Tien the article on amendments was under consid-
eration in the clcring days of the Convention, Sherman m"ved that
amendments snould not be passed sftecting either the internal poiiG<
of any state or its eouality in the Senate (3). Because of the
opposition to establisning a precedent of special limitation on the
amending power, the motion was lost. This seemed to the small
states to bode ill for their future v;elfare, especiniy as regards
their equality in tne upper house, ivicrris.in order to quiet the
murmurs of the small states and to restore harmony, moved that " no
The small states would secure the maximiiim influence
Morris finally became reconciled to the fact that e-
(1) Farrand
,
II, 2b. (2) ibid, II, 95. (30) Ibid, II, 610.

55
state without its oonsent shall be deprived of equal suffrage in
tne JSenate This was agreed to "-ith out opposition (1)%
IJorris constantly urged that all unsettled questions
be decided in favor of the national government and at the expense
of the state governnent. One of these questions was as to the pay-
men-c oi tne legislature. It had been debated in the uonventicn
\vhile r".orris was absent in june, but nothing had been done ahout
it. The Committee of Detail reported on August 14 for payment by
the respective states (2). This plan woiild leave part oi the con-
trol of the congressmen in the hands of the states,— a thing that
was contrary to ITorris* views on the subject. He offered as a
substitute that tne -nayraent oe out oi tne national treasury, the
quantum to be left to the discretion oi tne national legislature.
The motion was passed by nine states to two.
As to the powers of Uongress I.Iorris urged the greatest
extension possible. He wouia oppose no grant ox power which less-
ened the power of the states ana increased tne power oi the nation-
al government. Me urged that Congress be allov/ed to tax exports
as- well as imp-^rts (3). he wanted the whole power of commercial
regiilatlon given to uongress without restrictions (4) . He favored
'the pov/er of uongress to subdue rebellion in any state although
the Governor, nimseif, snouia oe 't its head,' and even if the Leg-
islature reiused to apply for nelp. tie said, " The general govern-
(5)
ment should enio-^-f^e ooedience in all cases where it is necessary' i
The one excerption to his desire to increase the power of Congress,
was in the case of emission of bills of credit.
(D^-arrand, II, 631. (2) Ihid, II, 290. (3) Ibid, II, 306.
(4) Ibid, II, 450. (5) Ibid, II, 317.
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Before Morris was out of his teens he had seen the fal-
lacy of paper money, and had opposed its emission at every opr^ortun
ity. He favored the interests of the creditor, comraercial class as
opposed to' the debt or , agrarian class. During his residence in
Pennsylvania he was one of the leaders in opposition to "bad financic
legislation, which had as its basis paper money. Following out the
same principles in the Convention, Morris moved that the clause,
" to emit bills on the credit of the United States", be struck
from the powers of Congress (1). The friends of pfiper money urged
the retention of the clause, but Morris' motion prevailed.
The powers that were granted to Congress Morris inter-
preted in the broadest manner, giving evidence of what later became
Federalist pnlitlcnl doctrines. When the clause prohibiting
the states from laying embargoes was under consideration, Morris
opposed its adoption because he thought that the general power
to regulate interstate trade would lover the situation (2). M^Henry
records that he consulted Morris aboiit insetting a power enabling
Congress to erect piers and preserve navigation in the harbors,
but Morris thought that it could be done under the clause " provide
for the common defense and general welfare"' (3). Again, on con-
sideration of a TDOwer of Congress to establish a National Universitj;
Morris said that it would not be necessary as the exclusive power
at the seat of government will reach the object (4). Morris would
not limit the grant of power to the exact words used, but v.as will-
ing to iri^ly a grant rf any power that the broadest interpretation
would bring under the clause. He was a believer in the doctrine
fl) J^arrand, II. 309. (2) Ibid, II. 241. (3) Ibid, 11,529
(4) Ib'd
,
II, 616.
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of broad construction.
Morris was very influential in the constitution of the
Executive, where his especial service was in the determination of
the method of election. The whole question of how to call forth
one of the people as chief executive, and how to clothe him with
appropriate powers, was a most perplexing one. Other federal gov-
ernments had no separate executive branch, and elective monarchies
offered no available precedents. Therefore, the Convention had to
vfork out the whole plan of its executive in detail, a wearisome
task because of the frequent changes in opinions. As an illustra-
tion of the difficulty of securing a definite decision on any one
point, over thirty- five votes were taken on the method of election
alone.
The Virginia plan had the Executive elected by the Leg-
islature, and without any change the Committee on Detail reported
the clause on July 17. Morris objected. "If the Legislature elect,"
he said, "it will be the work of intrigue, of cabal, and of faction.
It will be like the election o^" the Pope by the Conclave of Cardi-
nals; real merit will rarely be the title to appointment." He moved
for an election by the citizens of the United States (1). Ee was
almost universally opposed
,
and on the vote only Pennsylvania re-
corded an aye.
On the method of election of the Executive depenried
the length of the 1 erm of office and his re-eligibility, which sub-
jects the Convention now took up. The Committee of Detail had re-
ported for ineligibility, out the Convention struck out that clause,
and made the Executive eligible a second time (2)* This gave rise
fl) Farrand, II, 29. (2) Ibid, II, 33.

to the fear the Executive would be too dependent on the Legisla-
ture. To obviate this difficulty, Dr, HoClurg moved that the Exec-
utive hold office during good behavior. Morris expressed his great
joy, and declared his indifference to the method of choice if the
tenure was to be during good behavior f 1) , That was nearer to his
own principles of government than he had supposed would be pro-
posed. It was not monarchy that he sought to attain, but rather the
elements of permanence and independence in the Executive. Several
membeis supported McClurgs motion, brt Lladison notes that most of
them did so more from a desire to alarm those attached to a depen-
dence of the J^^xecutive on the legislature, than from a belief in
this sort of tenure, when it came to a vote, the motion was lost
by four states to sixfS). It was then decided to reconsider the
Tjuestion ot re-eiigioiiity.
When the [uestion came up again on July 19, Llorris made
an extended speech on the constitution of the L'xecutive. Because
of the gr'-^at extent of the country, he urged an Executive with suf-
ficient vigor to per-ade evory part of it. The Executive should be
the protector of the people against the tyranny of the Legislature,
But if the Executive is to be ineligible a second time, it will de-
stroy a great inducement to merit p-mblic esteem, and so be rewarded
with reappointment. Furthermore, if he cannot seek lavful re-elec-
tion, he may secure it by the sword, and even in the short period
he will be in office, he vdll make the best of it in the accumula-
tion of wealth. Llorris went on to oppose impeachment as another
means of making the -liJxecutive independent. If the Executive was
to be the guardian of the people,, let him be elected by the people;
(1) x^arrand.II, 33. (E) ibid, II. 36.
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if he is to "be a oheok on tno Legislature, let him not be impeach-
able. The people would express their views as to the best man in-
telligently, for they v/ould knov/ all the prominent men in the coun-
try. Ivlorris saw no way of making the Executive independent of the
Legislature, except to make the office for good behavior, or to
put t?ie election in the hands of the people. Therefore, Morris
moved that thB whole constitution of the Executive should be recon-
sidered (1). This motion was passed unanimously.
Ellsworth now brought forward the method of election
by electors appointed by the State Legislature, but the members to
be apportioned to the people. This plan was adopted for the time '
being on July 19 (2), The opponents of the rystem of elnction by
electors brought forward the objections of the inconveniency and
expense of getting all the electors together, and sunh was the po-
tency of tneir arguments that on July they secured a reconsid-
eration of the m.ethod of election. lillection by the Legislature
was again adopted, which brou'^nt up tnose vexing questions of re-
eligiDility and length of terra,. Morris was dismayed^ ana declared,
" Of all posslDie mocics of appcintm.ent that by the Legislature is
the worst". He urged a short term
,
re-eligibility, and a differ-
ent mode of election. He had changed his ideas in regard to im-
peachment, and r.rged that it was proper if the term was to be. of
any lengtli f 3)
.
The small states were afraid that a popular election
would put them at a disadvantage, in tnat the Executive v/ould al-
ways be a resident of a large state. Ilrrris brought forward as a
solution for that difficulty, a plan whereby each voter voted for
fl) ^'arrand, II, b^i-b4. (2) Ibid, II, 58. (3) Ibia
,
11,103-5.
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two raen, one of whom should not T^e from his own state. Even this
did net clear away the difficulties in the rinds of tlie opponents
to the system of election by electors; therefore on July 2G the
clause was adopted as reported from the Committee of the v;ho3e,
t?iat the Executi7t) he appointod by me Legislature for seven years,
and that he he ineligible a second time (1). In this form the
clause was referred to the Committee on Detail.
The Committee on Detail did not change the clause, but
reported it as received on August 24 (2). The opponents of an
election by the Legislature brought in a moti-^n to substitute
election by the people, but they were decisivly defeated (3), How-
ever, r^lorris would not see a clause adopted, which seemed to him
so utterly bad, without strong objection. To guard against the
evils of corruption and cabal in the Legislature, he desired a
purely popular election, but the vote had Just shown that an im-
possibility. Therefore, he revived the plan v/hich seemed to him
the next oest, an election oy eietiiors chosen by the -neople of the
several states (4). Although this motion had the support of five
states, it failed to ^.ass.
The method of election was not yet definitely decided
upon; therefore it went to the committee on unfinished Portions,
which was appointed on August 31, and of which Morris was a mem
ber. He was the most vigorous champion of the system of election
by electors in this committee, and he used all his Iniluence to
secure a favoraoie report for that plan. it was probably n^^t veiy
diriicult Pince a majority of the committee on Unfinished Portions
(1) ?arrand, II, 120. (2) ibid, il, 401. (3) ibid, I£, 402.
(4) Ibid, II, 404(5)lbid, 1^,481.
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already looked with favor upon the pian^ although some merahers
were strong siip^^orters of an eieotion by tls legislature. Brearly
was stron^a^ly in favor of any plan which would secure power to the
states, and had urged an election by the legislature, giving each
state one vrte (1). 'Villiamson had always supported an election
by the legislature (2). Gilinan had not expressed his sentiments.
Sherman thought that the President should be elected by the legisla^-
.
^
(4)
ture{3). lie later favored tlie system of electors, but this was not,
until after the OomCiitteee on 'Unfinished Portions had reported, and'
the change on mind must have taken place during the deliberations
of the committee
. Baldwin did not care for the electoral system
at first, but he also changed his mind, and after the report of
the committee he said: "The plan was not so objectionable after
being v/ell considered as at ":'irst view"f5). Butler favored part
of the plan, but he opposed any inequality in the states (6).
Madison (7), GarrolfO), Diokensonf 9) , and iiing(lO) had all express-
ed a preference either for a popular election or, foiling that, an
election by ol--^ctors. Thus in the com^ ittee there were five men •
who consistently favored an election by electors, three who were
not favr^rable to the whole plan until after the committee had re-
ported, two who opposed any plan but election by the legislature,
and one of whom we have .lo record.
Morris, the leading supporter of the electoral sys-
tem,was instrumental in securing the favorable votes from the
(l)Farrand, 11, 403. (2) Ibid, II, 32 (3) Ibid, II, 401.
(4) Ibid, II, 499. (5) Ibid, II, 501. (6) Ibid, il, 112
(7) Ibid, II, 110. (8) Ibid, II, 404. (9) Ibid, II, 114.
(10) Ibid, II, 55.
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three who chr.nged their opinions during the del i herati ons of the
conmittee. That made a favorable maj ority^ -hloh on September 4
reported the section providing ''"or election of the President by
electors chosen in each vState. I'o obviate the difficulty of the
incCnvenience and expensf^ of coming to the seat of government to
cast their v-tes, it was provided that tley shoi^d meet in their
respective stat-^s, vote, and tlien transmit the vote to Congress
where it should be counted. In case no one secured a majority
for President, the Senate was to choose from the five highest on
the list. The m.an having Iho second greatest number of votes was
to be Vice-rresident , and in case of a tie the Senate was to make
a choice f 1)
.
The report provoked an immediate storm of debate,
and an explanation of the reasons for changing the mode of elect-
ing the axecutive was demanded. Morris rose to explain the reasons
of the committee and his own. The danger of intrigue and the neces-
sity of m.aking the executive independent of the legislature were
the chief reasons; dissatisfaction with appointment by the legis-
lature, the incOnveniency of the ineligibility demanded by that
ipode, and the anxiety of some for an immediate choice by the people
were other influential reasons for the action of the committee.
The desire to use the Senate as a court of impeachment, — vdiich
would be undesirable if the legislature also appointed — , was an-
other reason advanced by IJorris (2j.
Various objections were advanced to the new plan,
of v^fhich the ^ost urgent were obviated by amendments. A grovv'ing
distrust of the aristocratic tendencies of the Senate led the
convention to change the selection in the absence of a r.ajority
fl) ?arrand, II, 497-498. (2) Ibid, .II, 500.
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to the House of Representatives (l). To retain the power given the
states "by the choice residing in the Senate, il was provided that
each state should have but one vote. With a few additional amend-
ments
,
adopted in order to make the section as clear as possible,
the section was incorporated as part of the Constitution.
Morris v/as the moving force in the whole fight
against the selection nf the executive by the legislature. The
fact that time after time the convention decided upon an election
by the legislature did not deter him. At every possible chance
he brought up the plan of an election by electors until he secured
a favorable report from the Committee on Unfinished Portions,
which assured its final success.
Morris also had some influence on that very impor-
tant clause of the Constitution which says, "^^e executive power
shall be vested in the President of the United States", That
clause puts the whole responsibility of the administration of the
executive department on one man, the President, with no one to
share either the power or the renponsi bility . In this one clause
the Constitution established a government difierent from any that
existed at tnat time. Each state had its executive council, the
King of England had his Cabinet, and. the -European governments had
their ministers. It was hard to conceive of an executive department
established which vested the power in one man alone. At first the
convention assumed tnat a constitutional CounciX of State would De
provided beicre tne constitution wan linisned. " There must be
certain great officers of state, a minister of finance, of vmr, of
forei 'H affairs, etc," said Morris. "These, I presume, will exer-
(1) Farrand, II, 327.
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cise their functions in subordination to the executive, v/ill he a-
raenahle by impeachment to the public justic?e. With out these min-
isters an executive can do nothing of consequence " (1). This v;as
in the middle of July, and as no one submitted a plan of such ,
a
council, Morris turned his attention to that phase of the executive
department. Ellsworth declared some of his ideas as to a council,
but upon notice that Morris was going to present a plan, he let the
proposition lie over. Later Morris presented a plan v/hich provided
for a Council of State consisting of the ^hief Justice of the Su-
preme Court, Secretary of Domestic Affairs, Secretary of ITinance
and Commerce, Secretary of foreign Affairs, Secretary of War, Secre-
tary of Llarine, and the Secretary of ^tateCS). It provided that
the 'President could Esubmit any matter io the Goucil of ^tate, but
that he did not haVe to be bound by their opinions. This plan was
referred first to the Committee on Detail, and later to the Commit-
tee on Unfinished Portions.
The Committee on Unfinished Portions refused to
report the plan, but merely substituted a clause that the Presi-
dent might require the opinions of the principal officers in the ex-
ecutive department (3). Llason objected to the action of the commit-
tee on the grounds " that in rejecting a council to the President
we are about to try an experiment which the most despotic govern-
ments have never ventured. The '-'rand Seignior himself had his
Divan ", l^ranklin, Wilson, and Madison all urged consideration for
an executive council. Morris rose and explained his change of mind
and the opinion of the committee by saying that it was judged that
the President would acquire protection in his bad measures by per-
suading the Council of State to approve thera(4). The clause as
fDFarrand, 11,50. (2)Ibid,II, .> x^. (3) Ibid, II, 541. (4) Ibid , II , 542.

reported, --without a Gounoil of State--, was adopted.
Morris urged voluntary shirking of responsibility
by the President as the best grounds for discarding a Council of
State, hut in the end it would have probably been the involuntary
shirking of responsibility that would have damned the plan. Once
give an exGo::tive council the foothold of being supported in its
existence by the Constitution
, and it v7ould never stop in its
acquisition of power. The mere fact that the moiibers would have held
office only at the pleasure of the President, and that he w ould not
i
have been required to follow their advice, -/ould not have exerted
much influence in the long run. The British Constitution is foundec.
upon the same principles as the plan that Morris suggested, and yet
the King has become a mere figure head in the executive branch. The
Gounci:}. of State would have used every little precedent which they
might have established in the furtherance of the extent of their
power, until the dominant force in the executive department would
have been the Council and not the President. Under the present
system the Cabinet is entirely unknown to the Constitution, //ith-
out the sup>^ort of that document it can become of little importance
as compared v/ith the President, in whom is vested the executive
power of the United States. Morris and his colleagues did better
than they knew when, discarding all precedents, they established
a one man executive, sharing no power but that of appointment, and
sharing the responsibility with no one.
Since he was interested in the establishment of a
stable executive department, Morris ' urged appointment of ofL'ice-^s
should be by the President. -^he convention did not incline to
(1) Farrand, II, 44..
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Morris's view, but proposed to vest the appointive power in the Sen-
ate. Gorham made a mntion on July 18 to have the President appoint
the Judges, vhioh motion Morris seconded, but it failed to pass(l).
Morris said that if the Senate alone was given the appointive power
there would "be too little responsibility and too much intrigue(2).
He favored giving the President the power of nomination and the !
Senate the power of confirming, .jince that would secure both respon-
sibility and security. The power of appointment was finally refer-
red to the Oomraittee on Unfinished Portions, which reported for
i
appointment by the President, by and with the advice and consent of
the Senate, and in that form 'he clause was adoptedfS). Morris
later secured even a greater increase in the executive pov;er in a
clause which provided " that Congress may by law vest the appoint-
ment of such inferior officers as they think proper in the President
alone, in the courts of lav/, or in tne heads of departments" (4).
Morris's motives in the establishment of the execu-
tive were purely nationalistic ones. A strong, firm, and indepen-
dent exec^.itive meant to him a national government; therefore he
opposed anything which was inimical to such strength, firmness, or
independence. Many of Morris's contemporaries had keen remembrances
of the misuse of power by the royal governors, and were not anxious
to give the executive much power. Morris had a keener vision, and
distinguished as to the source from whence the popularly elected
executive would draw his power; therefore he used his efforts to
putting all possible prwer in his hands. Bancroft intim.ates that
Morris underhandedly attempted to seciire a life tenure by means of
fl) Farraiid,II, 44. (2) Ibid, II, 389. (3) Ibid, 11,^39
(4) Ibid, li, 627.

67
a oornbination of the electoral system with eleotion by the Senate.
He said that Morris figured out that under the electoral system no
man would ever secure a majority, but that the election would al-
ways he cast into the Senate. Then by a junction between the out-
going President and the aristocratic Senate the President would se-
cure re-eloction for life(l). The above charge is an injustice to
a man who on every oc-^.asion boldly and frankly enunciated his true
opinions and the object he sought. To refute it we only need to
refer to Morris's own action in the convention. On September 6 he
urged a ^proposition of Gerry's that in case of no majority the clec
tion should be referred to both branches and not just t'o the Sen-
ate(2). Morriis even went farther than this, and suggested that
the President in office should be re-eligible only in case he
should secure a majority in t?ie elctoral college (3). Morris at
this time had discarded ell idea of a tenure for good behavior,
since he was satisfied 1;hat the electoral system v;ouid secure the
independence that he desired. But if Morris had still desired a
tenure during good behavior, he vould have urged it openly, and not
have tried to secure it by a subterfuge.
The questions of the veto po^^'•er and the establish-
ment of the judiciary are very much mixed up, ecause oi the propo-
sition to combine the Supreme uourt witn the President in a Hevis-
ionary Council. The idea of the Revisionary Council was first
brought up in the Committee of the Vhole,and was discarded as the
veto power was vested in the President. V/ilson revived the plan
on July 21. Moriis had allowed the introduction of the same
plan of a Council of Revision to be introduced into the ITew York
(1) Bancroft, History of the Constitution, II , 176-177
.
(£) ?arrand, II, 522. (2) Ibid, II, 527.
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Constitution, and here again he half-heartedly favcred it. He saic
that he was apprehensive that even the auxiliary weight and firra-
ness of the judiciary would not give the executive sufficient pro-
tection against encroachment of the legislature fl). '^he propo-
sition was again defeated, and upon being "brou -^ht up in the middle i
of August was once nrre defeated. Morris regretted very much the
defeat of the motion t?iG last time, because at that time the elec-
tion of the President was in the hands of the legislature, and he
thought it needed this additional support to secure its indepen-
dence. As it vms the President had a veto which could be overruled
by a two-thirds majority. I.Iorris urged an absolute veto in place
of the qualified one, and his words at least had the effect of
getting the two-thirds changed to a three-fourths ( 2) . In the
closing days of the convention the m.ajority needed to overrule a
veto was changed back again to two-thirds, vvith Morris strongly
objecting, Morris's support of the Hevisicnary Council was due
to a desire to secure rdded support for the executive against the
body that elected it, the legip.lature. ;7hen the electoral system
was adopted Morris favored a veto in the President
,
but he did
not want it so qualified as to be worthless.
Even after the judiciary had been eliminated from
the veto power, Morris believed that they should retain some con-
trol over legislation. This control was the power of declaring
laws unconstitutional. In a speech on August 15 he said: " I can
not agree that the judiciary shall be bound to say that a direct
violation of the Constitution is law,» Encroachments of the
popular branch r^f government ou ht to be guarded against " (S)
(1) Farrand, II, 298. (2) Ibid, II, ^01,- (-5) Ibid, II, 299.'
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Snch expre'ssions sho^. that Morris was one of those in the oonventio
who thought that the judiciary had the power of deolaring laws .mconj
stitutional.
There was very little actual contention in the con-
vention as to the estahlishment of a Judiciary, hut where there was
contention Morris usually held the prevailing views. He favored
the appointment of the judges by the executive, but conceded that it
might be with the advice and consent of the
-Senate (1). He urged
the necessity for the establishment of inferior tribunals. The ter
of office for the judiciary had been made during good behavior, but
on August 27 Dickinson moved that the judges should be removed by
the President on the application of Congress. Morris opposed the
motion on the grounds that the judiciary should not be subjected to
(2)such an arbitrary authority. The motion was defeated
Morris believed stromly in the theory of separation
of powers. He would make the exception, however, in case of one
department being weak and needing protection. Under that exception
he rjrged the Kevlsionary Council. As long as one branch was as
strong as another he objected to no increase in power, since that
all tended to strengthen the national government. He wanted to
subordinate the state governments because to him state attacliments
were the hane of the country,
-t^ationali sm was the dominant tone in
all his work on the fundamentals of government.
The slavery question was one that could not be set-
tled, but contimied to bob up and vox the convention under a variety]
of guises. IVhen the CoiTimittee on Detail ' reported the clauses on
representation, August
.36, .opposition arose to the contim.ed
fl) i'arrand, II, 41,44. (2) Ibid, II, 428.

importation of slaves. Llorris cliil not slop bv otjeoting to the
importation, but r-o -ed that there should he no representation excep
:
of free inhabitants fl)
.
" I never will concur in 77pholding domes-
|
tie slavery';, he said, ^e compared slave holding states with the
\
free states, to the great disadvantage of the Elave states. He :
again printed out the inconsistency in counting only three-fifths
of the slaves as population, or in couiiting only wealth in slaves
and no other wealth. He gave way to sectional interests
,
and de-
manded, " V/hat is the proposed compensation to the northern states
for a sacrifice of every principle of right, every impulse of human--
ity. '•^'hey are to bind themselves to march their militia to the de-
fence of the South." He grandiloquently concluded with, " I would
sooner submit to a tax for paying for all the negroes in the United
States than saddle posterity with such a Constitution ".(2). It
was a defeated motion as soon as made, and evon the one affirmative
vote of New Jersey was a surprise. As far as counting slaves in tho
representation vras concerned, that was settled for good, but the
skirmish had ^ust begun on the limitation of the slave trade.
The question again came up on August 21 with the
report of a clause prohibiting a duty on exports, on slaves, and
forbidding any prohibition of the importation of slaves. The
South had opposed any duty on exports, and although Morris reminded
them that " these local considerations ought not to impede the gen-
eral interest ", the convention adopted that part of the clause
which concerned exports(3).
The rest of th'^^ sootion caused some little discussioi..
To those who urged a prohibition of or a tax on the importation of
fl) T:^arrand,il, 221. (2) Ibid, II, 221-2:3. (3) Ibid, II, 363.

slaves, the South replied that she would never confederate on such
terras. South Carolina and Georgia were especially outspoken in
their demands, and refused to adopt any Constitution which threaten
ed the slave trade, while North Carolina intimated that she would
follow the exarm-ie of her neighbors on the south. In an attempt
to remove the difficulty Tinkney moved to commit the clause in
order that the slaves might be made liable to an import tax(l).
Morris saw the hopelessness of reaching any harmonious opinion on
the subject. He was greatly opposed to slavery, and gladly would
have seen the im-ortation of slaves stoppeci. He also favored
the taxing of exports. Neither of these propositions, however, was
so important to him that he Would not consent to a compromise for
the ulimate good nf the country. Understanding the im^possihility
of the South' s confederating if the slave trade was abolished, he
wished to have the Alicle section committed, including the clauses
relating to taxes on exports and the navigation act. " These thing!
may form, a bargain among the northern and southern states ", he
said (2),
Accordingly the clauses were committed, and on Aug-
ust 25 reported to the convention- A tax was to be laid on the im-
portation of slaves, but tlie iirprrtation was not to be prohibited
by the legislature prior to the year 1806. Amended so that the
tax should not excede ten dollars per porson, and that the year
should be 1808, the clause was adopted. In urging this as a com-
promise Morris was putting his love of America above his love for
any section, ^reed
,
or class, and it is to his credit rather than
to his disgrace that he finally consented to recognize the slave
(1) Farrand, II, 375 (2) Ibid, II, 374
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traffic. "Without aiich reoognition imlon \^onld have been impos-
sible.
i^orris was interested in the clauses on the admis-
sion of new states becaiise of his opposition to. the vVest.
-^he Com-
mittee on Detail reported for admission of new states by a two-
thirds m^ajority of Congress, such admission to be on the same terms
as the original states. When the clause came up on August 30, Mor-
ris moved that the clause read: " Hew states may be admitted by
the legislature into this union; b^it no new gtate shall be erected
within the limits of sny of the present states without the consent
of the legislature of such state, as well as the general legisla-
ture fl). By this clause the legislature would not be compelled
to admit any states except on such terms as it desired, and Morris
honed that this would secure permanent subordination of the V/est.
The last part of the clause was :ohrased by Morris with an idea
of protecting the large states in their claims to western territory.
I'his brought on the old conflict between the landed and the landless
states since the landless states were unwilling to guarantee the
territorial claims of any other state. Morris pointed o-;t that if
the claure was rejected with h forced division of the landed states
as an object of the new system ^ that "the gentlemen from these
would pretty quickly leave us" (2). The clause as Morris framed
it was adopted the next day (3).
Still following Morris, the convention took up the
clause bearing on the regulation of territories
. The landed states
v/anted further guarantee of their territoT^ial claims ,, while the
landless states desired the claims guaranteed to the '-'nited '^tates.
(1) J^arrand, II, 455. (2) Ibid, II, 4r^6. (3) Ibid, II, 46'1.

^ilson and laadison tnought it best to leave the whole question in
statu quo, and thus escnpe the need of coining to any decision
either one vmy or the other. In order to satisfy "both sides, Mor-
ris offered the olF.use in the following rords: " Ihe legislature
shall have the i^ower to dispose of and make all needful rules and
regrilations resneoting territory or ether property belonging to
the United States: and nothing in this Constitution cmtained
shall be so construed as to prejudice any olaims, either of the
United States or of any particular state (I). In that form the
clause was ado-oted.
When the question of suffrage qualification?: arose
Morris took the aristocratic side in that he urged freehold suf-
frage. Hason introduced a clause on July 26 which provided that
members rf the legislature must have landed property and must not
have unsettled accounts wltn the United States (2). TJorris said
that he mucn >--referred .ualificoti ons in the electors. ile opposed
the last part rf t -e clause becuase of the large number ot public
creditors it 7-ould exclude from holding ofrice, and lie said, " It
is l-'Ut a scheme of the landed against the moneyed interest " (3)
Personalty sav; the danger to whicn it was sub^lected, and sec^ired
the defeat of the clause. Morris had another opportunity to urge
qualificatims in the electors cxi August 7 when the (Jomm.ittee of
Detail reported that qualification of electors should b^- fixed by
the states. He moved to strike out the clause in order that he
might substitute some other provision to restrain the right of suf-
frage to freeholders.
r,!orris had been active in the liev/ York Gonvention
(1) ?arrand, II, 466. (2) Ibid, II, 121. (3) Ibid, II, 12;
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in reserving the right of suffrage to freeholders, he had been
brougiit up in an aristoaratio sooiety which knew no other kind of
suffrage, and this environment often exerted its influence. Earlier
in tne convention it made him urge representation proportioned to
wealth as \'-ell as mynbors. His defeat on that proposition did not
prevent his trying again to give property what he thought was its
due importance.
,
In his argument for freehold suffrage he did not
confine himself tn the merits of that system, hut \rent on to say
that it was not T)roT)er that the qualifier ti nns of the electors
of members of Congress should depend on the will of the states fl)
.
He professed tc believe that giving tiie vote to non-property hold-
ers would threaten the country with an aristocracy in that they
would sell their votes to tlie rich. 'i'his train of r oasoning ran
back to th(3 old I'ew York manors wlicre the manor holder commanded
all the votes on his land. l'.]adison supported I.Iorris, likewise
thin: ing the freeholders the safest guardians of our rights and
fearing the dominion of the rich over the poor. 'i'he majority of
the convention, however, were afraid to excite the jealousy of the
neoT)le by depriving tnem of votes for federal offices vhpn they
might vote in the states, and the motion for freehold suffrage was
lost (2).
The method of ratification was a question v>/hich caran
up several times during the coirrse of the convent! rn , and on which
soFie very ciivprse views were expressed. Cn July 25 the clause of
the Virginia plan which required ratification by state conventions
was reported to the convention. 35]llsworth and .'"atterson urged that
(1) Farrand II, 201. (2) Ibid, II, 206.
'
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ratification be by the State le^p'-slatures instead. Morris
I
pointed out that the convention was not proceeding on the "basis of
: the Confedercntion, but v;as in fact not le2:al under the Confederation
Ratification by the State legislatures ^-ould r equire unanimous con-
sent, otherv/ise the courts would hold the proposed Constitution
void as unconstitutional; while if the Constitution was referred
directly to the people, the federal compact could be altered by a
majority of them.
-^n pursuance of such ideas r.Icrris moved that
the Constitution be referred to one general convention chosen by the
people; however, this motion was not seconded (1), but it was decid-
ed to refer tne Constitution to State conventions.
V/hen the section came up again on August 30 in
a report of the Committee of .detail, Morris moved that the State
legislatures bo left free to select their own modes of ratification,
his idea being to facilitate the adoption of the plan(2). Again,
however, the convention went on record as favoring ratification by
State conventions. T.Iorris was eager to secure speedy ratifications,
preferably by the r^eople.
-^earing the dilatory methods of State
legislatures, he offered ai clause requiring the legislatures to pro-
vide for conventions as speedily as circuijjstances would permit.
This was going too far in the way of dictation, and the convention
rejected the clause (3), Morris finally was fairly content with
the method of ratification by State convention^, because it was
more nationalistic than ratification by the State legislatures.
Probably Morris' most important services in the
convention were as a member of the Committee of Style. This commit-
tee was appointed September 8, and was composed of Johnson, Hamilton,
fl) ?arrand II, 93. ' (E) Ibid, II, 476. (3) Ibid, II, 478.
'

Morris, Iladison, and King f 1) . Its duty v/as to revise and arrange
the articles that had been agreed to in oonvention. The convention
had given snch long-continued and oft-renewed attention to every
part that it would Foem as if there could be no improvement on the
language, and that the only change could he in the arrangement.
However, much of the phraseology was changed in order that in
later years there might not be the least possibility of ambiguity.
This work of molding ideas into definite expression
was hardly the work of five men; therefore Johnson, who was chair-
man, turned the whole thing over to Gouvernour i'orris. Morris in
later life wrote: " That instrument fthe Constitution) vms Vv'ritten
by the fingers which v;rite this letter" (2), riadison records," The
finish given to the style and arrangement of the 'Jonst itution be-
long fairly to r;r. Morris" (3). It is doubtful whether the work
could have been better done. All equivocal and redundant expres-
sions were excluded, and the ideas were expressed both clearly and
vigorously. I'orris by his lucid and terse language reduced the
labor and hazard of interpretation for all time, for there was no
ambiguity after he had finished.
The Committee on Style not only rev;rote and re-
arranged the articles, but they added at least one clause which
was, " No state shall pass any law impairing the obligation of con-
tracts ". King on August P.S had moved that a prohibition be la-id
on the states to interfere in private contracts. Morris did not
v/ait to be enlightened by discussion, but at once opposed the clause
on the grounds that it went too far in interference with state leg-
islation. T.Torris thought that tlie clause v/ould apply to all laws
fl) '^arrand II, 547. (2) Ibid, III, 419. fS) Ibid, III, 499
mm
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regulating the nanner o l" suing on ocntracts in the courts, in that 1
all suoh lai-s interfered in nrivate contracts ; tlierefore would he
!
unconstitutional fl). He s^fw the true purpose of the clause when '
it was suggested that a prohibition on ex post facto laws would '•
cover the suhject. Since the merabe s thought that interference in :
contracts would corae under the clause on ex post facto la.vs, Kings
motion was rejected. The next day Dickenson reported that Black-
stone hnd it that ex post facto related to criminal cases only, and
^
that furtner provision vould be necessary. In the press of further :
business, nowever, nothing was done.
Someone on .t.ne Cornniittee of Style remembered tne
difficulty that Dickenson had sugfostecl, and secured the insertion
of the prohibition of the impairment of the obligation ot- contracts,
Since Morris had opposed the clause when first offered, it would
seem unlikely that he inserted the clause at this time. Hov/ever,
at that time Korris did not understand the true purpose of the
clause, ncT its analogy to the prohibition on ox post facto laws.
The debates enlightened !Iorris
,
and he sav/ the matter in its
true light. It was especially pointed out that this prohibition
v;as similar to a prohibition on bills of craditfC), a proposition
that I,Iorris favored. Such arguments would be very apt to gain
his support tor tne clause. The presumption that Morris inserted
the clause is very m.uch strengthened when we find him writing,
" Propositions to countenance the issue of paper money and the
consequent violation of contracts must have met with all the oppo-
sition that I could rake" (o). In the absence of better evidence
fl) i<'arrand, II, 442
(3) Ibid, II, 419.
(2) roi(J
,
II, 440
.
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it is probable that Llorr is added that very important clause
which our private contraotual rights aro protected
After the Gornrnittee on Style reported, the conven-^
tion again went over the Constitution and made some Kinor changes.
The time had cone for the 'Constitution to go forth to the people
for tlieir approval, and it was of the greatest importance that
every man in the convention signi+-y his support of that document
by signing it. To get the support of all was difficult because there
was not a man in tho convention who had not seen the defeat of some
pet proposition, and to many the whole Constitntion was bad. In
order to gain the support of a ±'pw v;ho v/avered betv/Gon rsigning and
' not signing, a simple form of attestation was offered which said that
the Constitution had received tne unanimous consent of the states
present (1} . This ambiguous form was drav.71 up by Norris and
presented by yranJ<lin with the idea thai it was uerely an attesta-
tion of ap-^rcval of all the states present, and did not imply that
any mem.ber personally approved the Constitution.
Before Llorris himself signed, he made one last
plea for support for tho Constitution. " I too have objections",
he said, " but I consider the -'-^resent r.ian as the best that is to
be attained, and sahll talro it wij,. <^x its faults. The majority
have determined in its favor, and by that determination I shall
abide. The minute this plan goes forth all other conoiderations
will be laid aside, and the great question will be, shall there be
a national government or not. This must take place or a general
anarchy v;ill be the alternative. "(2).
franklin and Hamilton added their voices to Llorris '
fl) ?arrand, II, 64S,. (2) Ibid, II, 645.
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and urged that overy man should sign. Blount was won over by the
aiTibiguity of the forin proposed for attestation, and he agreed to
attest the fact that the Constitution was the unanimous act of the
states in the convention fl). Gerry, Llason, and I^andolph, the other
recalcitrant members, however, persisted in their determination
not to sign. The remaining members who were present signed the
engrossed copy of the Constitution, and on September 17 the conven-
tion adjourned sine die.
fl) ^arrand, II, 64 6.
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VI. Conclusion.
It is now poSvSible to look back over the preceding
three and a hair months, and to pick out the salient features of
Morris's work in the convention.
Vfe find him coming to the convention while yet a
young man, but better prepared for the work before hiro than most of
his colleagues. He was a lawyer. He had had experience in the
legislative and executive branches of both the state f.nd national
governments, and better than that, experience in one state constitu-
tionnl convention. He was a student of political science, and he
combined a practical knowledge of his ov;n and past governments
with a fair insight into the constitutional theories on which those
governments were founded. He cam^e to the convention an intimiate
friend of t wo of its most important members, Alexander Hamilton
and Oeorge ;7ashington. Morris had various class and sectional in-
terests T/hich in a large part guided his actions, but we find that
his class and special interests were mu-^n less influential in his
case than with m.ost of the m.embers of the convention, and that
comparativly sioeaking he can be numbered with the most disinter-
sted and unselfish of the delegates
.
Morris's great aim throughout the \7h0le convention
v;as to establish a firm, stable, and enduring government, to
eliminate state attachments, , and to render the national authority
supreme. His views as to the best means to that end did not always
coincide with the views of the raicrity, for we often find Morris in
the minority. Yet he never became an obstructionist . On nearly

fvery proposition which he advanoed on proportional representation
he was defeated; yet he bowed to the will of tho Liajority without
ir.aking nny rash statements as to "never confederating on such terras
v/hich were so often heard from some of the other members. Some have
charged that Morris was a monarchist, and that he did not desire
to establish a stable, strong, democratic government as much as he
desired to establish a monarchy. Lodge in his article on Ilcrris
says that the charge is unjust fl). In reality the charge arises
from a misconception of the word monarchist. In the convention
the v;ord ronarchic was not always applied to a form of government
whose sovereign wa;3 a hereditary king, but was commonly applied
to any form of government which had a strong, single executive.
Randolph opposed a one man executive because of
its monarchic tendencies (2). Gerry was afraici to trust the exec-
utive with the a-opointivo power because that was a stride toward
monarchy fS). Dickenson urged removal of the executive on appeal
of -Lhe state legislatures, and in rebuttal to the opposing argument
that it would weaken the executive, he said," Such an executive
as some seem to contemiplate is not consistent with a republic. A
firm executive can exist only in a limited monarchy " (4). ;V}ien
the '"irginia plan was under discussion, Gerry said that the people
whould never agree to the system of government becau.e it was mon-
archic (5). Such expressions of sentiment show that the delegates
vsecL monarchic only as refe-'ring to a strong development of the
sir.gle executive. According to their use of the word, Ivicrris was
a monarchist since strength in the executive was the basis of his
fl) Lodge, Morrisf in the Atlantic Lionthly, 57: 436).
(2) ?ar.rand, 1,88. (5) Ibid,I,15i3. (4) Ibid, 1, 86. (5)Ibid,I, 485.
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creed.
Morris, however, did not nrge or believe in the es-
tablishment of a hereditary raonarohy as v/e imderstand it. Monarchy
is a definite term, and v;e usually apply it to a governinent in
which the duration of power in unlimited
,
while the degree of
power is but slightly raoriified. In every form of government which
Morris favorer! both the degree and duration of power was marked in
a way which clearly distinguished it from a monarchy. Llcrris never
wanted a hereditary executive, but he urged constantly an election
by the i-eople. The length of the term of the executive might be
long, but it was to be definitly marked, and it coulcl be ended at
any time by a constitutional removal of the incumbent. Measured by
our conception of the w-rd, Morris wa;-: not a monarchist.
The work of Morris that counted for most can best
be expressed in his own words. In writing about the convention in
after life he said," Lly faculties were on t?ie stretch to further
our business, ard to conciliate Jarring opinions "(l). Ho doubt
Morris' contributions to the Oonstitution were important, but no
man's contributions would have been important had tlie convention
broken up in discord. The men who sacrificed personal feelings
in order to preserve harmony, who sav; their pet propositions dis-
carded without using that as an excuse for obstucting the business
of the convention, who used their eff'orts to tem.ioer the objectional
"eaturos that were offered, are the men to whom the greatest credit
is due for our governm.ent. The Constitution is a bundle of compro-
mises, and the men who so barmonized conflicting opinions that
the corariromises were made possible are the men who really made the
(1) ?arrand, III, 419.

Constitution.
The very first day on which huvsiness was considered
I'Jcrris had an opoortunity to prevent some irritating dehates. Hara-
ilton had moved that suffrage should he proportioned to tne namher
of free inhabitants. Such a discussion would have provolred an ac-
rimonious discussion before the ornvention was fairly under way.
To prevent any diccord Morris supported a resolution which. merely '
provided for a .more equitable ratio than under the Gonfederation^'^^:
Later in the convention when the requirements for membership in
'
Congress were up for discussion, it was -oroposed that a seven years
citizenship be required. This wotilcl exclude some nen who were in
the convention itself, and some them became wrathy. To obviate
dif^'iculties Llorris proposed that the seven years should not appl,/
to anyone then a citizen. Vv'hen the debate had become b Liter over
proportional representation between the ITorth and the Sotth and
between the large and the small states, it was Liorris who tried to i
bridge the chasm wriioh seemed to separate the two parties. He
proposed that taxation should be in proportion to representation
in the hcpas that the one -oarty would be the less eager to secure
large repre-^entation, and that the other party would be the m-^re
willing to concede large reprec-^entation.
Morris opr.osed slavery and the continuance of the
slave trade, yet when the ^pr^ortunity for a compromise came, it was
Morris who siiggested it. The South was bitter because of the at-
tem:-ts to set a limit on the slave trade, v;hlle the llortn v;as firm
in its demands that Congress be given unlimited -oowor over coram.er-
cial regulations. Tlireats of dissolution were of every day occur-
rence. Then liorris suggested that these two things be referred to
fl) ?arrand, I, 36.
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committee in order that a bargain might Dc^ i'crmed between the North
and the South. Thus another great compromise of the Constitution
took placed) .
The final clotermination of the method or electing
the execiitive was full of compromises. The states desired as rir.ch
influence as possible; therefore the states wore made the electoral
districts. '^o conciliate those v;no urged popular elecLions it
was provided that the states might seloct the m-anner m wnioh the
ele-^tion of electors shoula be held. Some had urg?d that election
Should be by (Jongress; therefore the election is case of no major-
ity was given to the House. The small states were airaid that the
large states would Tiredoninate in the election because of the ten-
dency to vote for a m.an xvno ^-.as from the same state. riorris sug-
gest'id the plan of giving each man two votes , only 'one of which
co:3ld be cast for a native of the state in which the voter resided.
Morris was the chief influence in securing elecJtion by electors,
and he only secured tlie adoption of that plan by seeing that all the
above compromises and many more ?/ere agreed to.
In the very mianner in which IJorris phrased som.e of
the clauses he presented, we can see an effort to avoid conflicting
op'nions. One of the clauses that I.Iorris framed provided for the
admission of new stntes. The conflict arose on this point as to
whether tho small states would agree to guarantee the land claims
of the landed states, while the landed states did not want to sub-
scribe to a government where their territory might be diminished
by legislative act. The easiest way out of thw matter was to
leave it alone; therefore we have "ihose hesitating clauses as Llorrij
fl) ii'arrand, II, 374.
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framed them on the admission of new states. The clauses vere so
worded that eaoh r^arty thnisht that they were attaining their ob-
ject, yet really they were no better off than they were before.
Morris wav. often on the side that Inst by the com-
prorose, yet that did not alter his course of action. Lladison
writes; " It is diie to l.:r. Morris to remark that to the brilliancy
of his genius he adrind what is too rare, a candid surrender of his
opinions when the li<^nts. of diecussion satLsfiee him that they had
been too hastily formed, and a readiness to aid in making the best
of measures in which he had been over ruled "(l), ^-^e scorned to
stand in the way of progress because the convention had refused to
follow the path he thouf^ht it should. As long as it rms progress,
Morris v;as satisfied.
2'Iorris was undoubtedly one of the greatest men In
U-.e convention. Because of a lack of specific evidence for a man's
influence, it is difficult to detfermino exr.ctly what rank should be
give- any man in that assembly. ?ew ren, however, could e.;ual Lior-
ris's keen intellect and brilliant genius. IJn man there fought
more aggressivly firr the propositions he favored. IIo man was frank-
er in the objects he sought to attain. Tlorris's greatest fault
was his c^Tiioism and his deep rooted distrust of all riankind. He
could not interpret any act as moving from generous or unselfish
motives, but continually ascribed to his fellow men the basest
vices. It was this fault which caused some of his id^as to bo so
disliked, and it was the same fault which kept him from being a
greater man tlian he was.
Notwithstanding his faults, Oouverneur Ilorris was
fl) Sparks, Gcuverneur Liorris, I, 286,
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one of the groatest Americans of his period, and theje are but fev/
of his contemporaries to vhorn we cv/e nore for their efforts in
establishing the American Gorainonwealth.
Finis.

87
BIBLIOGRAPHY
The following bibliography does not pretend to "be
exhaustive as regards books of a general character which cover
the sarae subjects and period as the foregoing paper. Only such
books of a general character have been included from v^-hioh facts
or ideas were actually taken and used. The bibliography does
include all the records or notes taken at the federal Convention,
all biographies and articles on Gouverneur Morris, and all books
which contain letters written either to or by Morris. Ko dupli-
cation of material v/hich is found in several different forms has
been attempted with th-- one exception of the records of the fed-
eral Convention. Critical comment has been included only in the
case of books which were used rather extensively.
Sources.
Carter, N.H.,and Stone, YUL» Reports of the Proceedings and
and Debates of the Convention of lo2l. Albany, 1021.
Documentary History of the Constitution of the United States of
America. Three volumes, Washington, lbV4#
Farrend, Max. The Records of the i^ederal Convention of 1787,
Three volumes. New Haven, 1911.
In three volumes ^'"arrand has sought to incl-;de every
scrap of useful information as to what was actually done at the
federal Convention. In the first two volujiiOS he has included
the official journal and a record of the ayes and noes on each
question, drafts of the Constitution in the Committee of Style

88
and in the Committee of Detail, and all the notes or r.iemoranda taken
"by the delegates, of which liadison's notes are the most important.
This material has all been arranged
. chronologioally so that the
journal and all the noles taken on a particular day come together.
The third volume includes all other material explanatory of the
convention such as letters, diaries, speeches in ratifying conven-
conventions, speeches in Congress, and extracts from the j'ederalist.
The various plans that were presented to the convention are- also in
the third volutoe.
For the material incl^^ded, ?arrand ' s work is the
best and is the standard. Nor only is it complete, but the mater-
ial is so well arranged that it can "be most easily used,
Hamilton, Alexander. Works of Alexander Hamilton. Edited by J.G.
Hamilton. Seven volimes. New York, 1850.
Hamilton, Alexander. Works of Alexander Hamilton. Edited, by
H.C.Lodge. Eight volumes. Now York, 1085.
Jay, John. Correspondence and Public Papers of John Jay.
Edited by H.P.Johnston. Foxir volumes. Nev/ York, 1090.
Journals of the Continental Congress, 1775 to 1739. Thirteen
volumes. Philadelphia, 1800.
Secret Journals of the Congress of the Confederation. Three
volumes. Boston, 1820.
V/ashington, George. Writings of George V/ashington. Edited
by W.G.li'ord. li'ourteen volumes. New York, 1890

89
Secondary V/orks.
Bancroft. George. History of the Formation of the Constitution
of the United States of America. Two voluraes. New York,
1882
Beard, Charles A. The Supreme Court and the Constitution. Hew
York, 1912.
Beard, Charles A. An Economic Interpretation of the Constitution.
New York, 1313.
This hook emphasises the property interests in the
Philadelphia convention, and especir lly the holdings in govorn-.
ment securities betv7e<^n 1779 and 1799. That government holdings
exerted any great influence on the Constitution if a fact that he
fails to prove. Most of the holdings were in the hands of McGlurg,
Dayton, Gerry, Johnson, and Langdon, two of whoir. ;vere inconspic-
uous and one was an opponent of the Constitution. The great leaders
of the convention held Toractically no securities whatsoever.
The men who did hold puhlic securities cc::ld not
have obtained any great benefit from them from the Constitution, for
Beard himself says that Hamilton pumped five-eights of the value
into the public debt "by his funding system ( page 35). Then he
assumes that the men held the pa])er when they went into the conven-
tion which he finds thej- held afterward (page 75), But this does not
follow, for it is JuBt as probable that they bought the paper after-
th-^ convention as before. Most of the paper that he is able to
show was. held before the . convention was in the hands of Gerry,
Beard is right when ho says that the convention
wanted to protect the rights of property/ He opens up a field

90
that should prove fruitful to historical scholars in the future,
hut v;e can not bo sure of our conclusions until a great deal more
investigating has heen done than is represented in Mr Beard's hook,
llo doubt what he did represents a vast amount of labor, hut even
then the results are hut fragmentary.
Becker, Carl I. '-^-'he History of Political Parties in the Province
Hew York, 1760 - 1776. In the \7isGonsin History Series, II,
nnraher 1, page 320. Madison, -Visconsin, 1909.
Boutell, L.H. The Life of Roger Sherman. Chicago, 1896.
Channing, Edv/ard. A History of the United States. Three volur.es.
Hew York, 191ij.
Curtis, G.T. History of the Origin, formation, and Adoption of
the Corstitution of the United States. Two volumes. Ilew
York, 1861.
E'arrand, IJax. Compromises of the Constitution. In the American
Historical Reviev;, April, 1904. Hew York, 1904.
Lincoln, Charles Z. The Constitutional History of Hew York .
I?ive volranes. Rochester, Hew York, 1906.
Lodge, H.C. Historical and Political Essays. Boston and Hew
York, 1^92.
Lodge, H.C. Gouvorneur Morris. In the Atlantic Hontnly, April,
1086. Boston and Hev/ York, 1086.
McKinley, Albert Edward. The Suffrage franchise in tne Thirteen
Englisii Colonies in America. In the University of Penn-
sylvania History Series, nunber 2.
I.Ieigs, V/.I'-I. -^he Crovi^th of the Constitution in the li'ederal Con-
vention o.f 1787. Philadelphia and London, 1900.

91
Llorris, A.C. Diary and Letters of Gouverneur Llorris. Two vol-
lUTies. London, 18^9.
Roosevelt, Theodore. Gouverneur Llorris. Boston and llew York, ii
1888.
:
Roosevelt has written an animated and intensely
interest ly biography of Gouverneur Korris. He gives us a view
of the real Llorris, and with it a good background of politics, war,
governr:ent, and diplomacy of the period. '-^he volume is written i
with dash and spirit and on the whole is coimrendable
. At times
Roosevelt goes to the extreme in his praise or hlarae in what
L^eeins an effort to get away from a monotonous, oven style
which he so much disliked.
Sparks, Jared. A Life of Gouverneur Errris with Selections from
his Oorrespondence and ^iscellanoous
-'apers. i'liree voliimos.
Boston, 1832.
'^'his is the early standard life of ilorris.
-^he
first volume in biographical, rather dull, but often enlivened
by extracts frov Llorris' letters. The remaining two volumes con-
tain Llorris' s correspondence, miscellaneous writings, and addresreji.
Sparks overlooked most of Ivicrris's faults, and bestowed nothing
but praise. These volumes are not nearly so readable as the Life
by "Roosevelt.
Van Tyne, J. II. The American l-:cvolution. New York and -L^ondon,
1905.
V/elling, J.C. '-^he State's Rights Conflict over the Public Lands.
In the American Historical Association Papers, volume II,
number 2, 1889. Hew York and London, 1889.



